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Television and the Integration of Europe in the Era of Satellite Communications

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TELEVISION AND THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE
IN THE ERA OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

by

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B.A. June 1971, North Park College

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
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Approved by:

Philip Taylor (Director)

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ABSTRACT

TELEVISION AND THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE IN THE ERA OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

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The role television played in the integration of Europe through 1987 is examined in an analysis focusing on historical trends, integration theory, and the effect of satellite technology on the political environment in Europe. Television remained under the jurisdiction of national governments since its inception, satellite communications challenged the system of national control of television and changed television's role in Europe by introducing a revolutionary new delivery system. Integration theorists are cited to define the integration process and provide a foundation for a study of television's impact on European integration. Television policies in each nation are examined to document their past nationalistic nature. Intergovernmental organizations are surveyed to understand their function in the formulation of European television policies. The private sector's use of satellites is cited to document how its actions encouraged integration in the marketplace. It is shown that the integration of the television market will precede European integration and that satellite television provided the communication tool that will stimulate this integration.

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CHAPTER ONE
EUROPEAN TELEVISION AND
THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

On November 1, 1986, a television service that described itself as the first "truly European television service" ceased operations.¹ Appropriately enough, it had been called "Europa," and in concept it was to have created an entertainment and information source that people throughout the continent could watch regardless of the language they spoke. Europa was to utilize audio subcarriers on new, European-built and -launched satellites to simulcast programs throughout Europe in all its major languages. This technology made it possible to have many separate voice channels for each video image, enabling all Europeans to watch the same programs, yet hear them in their own languages.²

Europa was created in 1984 by the European

¹Throughout this thesis, "Europe" will refer specifically to the nations of western Europe. This will exclude activities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic.

²European Broadcasting Union, "Europa: Television for Olympus Satellite," 1986, pp. 1-4.

Broadcasting Union (EBU), the consortium of more than 100 private companies and national government departments responsible for broadcasting activities throughout Europe.³ From its beginning it was designed as a service to bring Europe together and champion European culture in its many varieties. It adopted the motto, "From Europe, for Europe." Its programs were to be of European origin because "Europe has its own culture and wholly European programming will reflect that culture and contribute to it." Programs also were to be selected for appeal to all Europeans to foster solidarity.⁴

Another major European intergovernmental organization (IGO) which championed Europa was the European Economic Community (EC). The creation of Europa partly was in response to a resolution of March 12, 1982, by the EC's European Parliament (EP), which called for the establishment of a "European television channel."⁵ The EC Commission lobbied for wide participation and funding and

³ Television is a broadcasting medium, involving the electronic distribution of simultaneous visual and audio images. It is also a communications medium, and a telecommunications medium, a term referring to the relaying of communication through electronic impulses. While broadcasting also refers to media such as radio, and telecommunications encompasses such media as telephones and telegraph, when used in this thesis these terms apply to television.

⁴ European Broadcasting Union, "Europa," pp. 2-3.

⁵ Commission of the European Communities, Television Without Frontiers, (COM (84) 300) (1984), p. 12.

gave \$1 million from its own budget in October 1986 to sustain Europa operations.⁶ The Commission believed Europa was a television service that could help fulfill its goal of "a unified European market in goods and services by 1992."⁷

The EC took a more vigorous role in encouraging European television activities because leaders throughout the Community concluded that television was pivotal in shaping the future of Europe. Commission Vice President, Lord Cockfield, expressed the view of the Commission that television was not just an entertainment medium or another business. "Television does not merely reflect but plays an important role in forming our modern society and our modern Europe." He concluded that "a fragmented Europe of national broadcasters is political and economic nonsense."⁸ This echoed the EP's charge that national government control of television and other mass media undermined efforts to foster a European identification among the peoples of Europe and reenforced national loyalties. "Information" was "the most decisive factor in European unification," but the system in which "information via the

⁶Ripa di Meana, speech delivered at the Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 16, 1986.

⁷Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes Common Standards for Television," Europe, December 1986, p. 16.

⁸ Ibid.

mass media is controlled at the national level" must be superseded by a uniform television policy if European unification was to be achieved.⁹

The Europa project developed significant support throughout the Community. Yet it faced many obstacles. Programming, production, and transmission costs proved higher than expected, and viewing audiences and advertising revenues were below projections. Although backed by the EBU, Europa was not financially supported by most EBU member-nations, since each nation retained the option of whether or not to participate. Such nations as France and the U.K. expressed interest in Europa,¹⁰ but after more than a year of operation, only five nations were participating in the project: the Netherlands (the host nation), West Germany, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy. Even though it was supported by these governments, the EBU, the EP, the EC Commission, and other organizations, Europa was forced to halt operations. However, the collapse of Europa brought new focus on the role of television in shaping the future of Europe. Europa had begun to demonstrate the potential of satellite television to provide daily programming for many nations simultaneously, but the fragmented European marketplace of 1986 made

⁹ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 2.

¹⁰ Di Meana Speech.

success impossible.¹¹

Europe's inability to work together to sustain Europa symbolized European political and economic realities in the mid-1980s. Europa's demise came during the same year the Community approved the "Single European Act," by which the EC became committed to the creation of a truly common market by 1992. The Community was to exist without internal impediments to the flow of goods and services throughout Europe.¹² But actions of Community member-nations in failing to support television activities like Europa seemed to contradict their commitment to pursue greater unification. Ripa di Meana, the EC Commissioner for Information and Culture, was one of the Community leaders who was puzzled by these contradictions. He believed the failure of Europe's nation-states to support Europa proved that Europe was still fragmented and approached issues primarily from national perspectives.¹³

European unification was the goal of men like Ripa di Meana and Lord Cockfield who worked within the political realm. At the same time, the actions of these men, nations, and organizations were continuously scrutinized by

¹¹ Pamela Williams and Laurel Wentz, "Europa TV in Trouble," Advertising Age, November 10, 1986, p. 72.

¹² "The Institutions of the European Community," Europe, May 1987, p. 23.

¹³ "Losses Prompt Europa Channel to Shut Down Operations," Multichannel News, December 15, 1986, p. 23.

political scientists who were students of the integration process. Europe became a living laboratory for these scientists as they sought to study the formation of political organizations and to understand more clearly the actions that took place in Europe. Integration theorists analyzed the formation of nations and identified the causes and impediments of integration. They also defined terms such as "integration." Europe was a region of on-going study because of its unique history and composition. Scientists specifically probed developments in post-World War II Europe to examine events in light of developed theory.

One of the most influential studies of the subject was a 1957 inquiry conducted by Karl Deutsch and seven colleagues at Princeton University. They defined "integration" as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population." These scholars defined "sense of community" as a "belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change."¹⁴ Using this

¹⁴Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim, Richard Van Wagener, Political

broad definition Europe could be described as "integrated." Deutsch, et al., divided integrated groups of people into two classifications:

(1) Groups became amalgamated when previously independent units merged into a new single larger unit, with a common government. The United States was an example of this kind of organization. Since European nations retained independent governments, Europe was not amalgamated.

(2) In contrast, pluralistic communities were composed of nations with legally independent governments. This kind of community existed when key leaders held relatively harmonized beliefs and expectations and acted in a predictable manner toward each other and the world. The relationship between the United States and Canada was an example of a pluralistic community. Since European nations maintained separate governments and had developed harmonized beliefs and expectations, Europe qualified as a pluralistic community.¹⁵

The respected integration theorist, Ernst Haas, defined "political integration" as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and

Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 6.

¹⁵ Ibid.

political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."¹⁶ Within this definition, Europe fell short of complete integration. The shift in loyalties was partial, and jurisdiction remained largely in the hands of national governments. However, developments related to satellite television demonstrated that expectations began to shift toward a new center in Europe and illustrated the important function television could play in integration.

Another integration theorist, Amitai Etzioni, distinguished between political communities and a larger group, which he called "political systems." When parts of systems were "interrelated," they might have different levels of integration. These kinds of systems were "interdependent." On the other hand, members of political communities were "integrated." This "integration of the members of a community is self-maintained by definition."¹⁷ Etzioni divided the unification process into four stages:

(1) The first was the preunification stage, which involved an identification of each individual unit before unification, a view of these units in aggregate form, the environment which impacted the unification, and the degree

¹⁶ Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

¹⁷ Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 137.

of interdependence and integration before the integration process began. Television was an environmental factor in this process.

(2) The second stage focused on the various ways elite groups influenced these units. When action involved force (including military, economic, or psychological), the power was said to be coercive. Elite groups acted in utilitarian ways when their actions came about through interaction in common social contexts. In the television debate, the elites in Europe included various governmental and intergovernmental organizations, special interest groups, business organizations, and entrepreneurs.

(3) In the third stage, preunification transitional conditions came into being and various groups and forces acted to bring about greater integration. Unification was achieved in increasing unit sectors. In Europe, this phase was being stimulated by the development of satellite television and the actions taken to increase pan-European television activity.

(4) The final stage concluded the process, when the organization became integrated or the integration process stopped.¹⁸

This thesis utilizes the model developed by Etzioni as it applies to the situation in Europe at the end of 1987. With Etzioni's four-stage model as a basis,

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 15, 16, 37, 51.

supplemented by the work of Haas and Deutsch, the concept that integration of television activity is leading to the integration of Europe is tested. The thesis demonstrates that satellite television modified the character of the European television industry and forced changes in efforts by national governments to control television activities. It shows that the introduction of satellite technology made television policy a bellwether of European integration efforts. If the nations of Europe were found to be blocking further integration of the television market, it is hypothesized that then they were blocking integration itself. The evolution of the television industry throughout Europe is cited as evidence of the impact of satellite technology on national controls over television and the decisions nations were forced to make regarding their overall role in the future of Europe.

This hypothesis assumes that no radical political changes take place to affect significantly economic, military, or political power in Europe or the world. It also assumes that the nations of Europe continue to work through their differences amicably, eschewing courses of action that would increase nationalism or divisiveness, and would actively embrace a European approach to their problems. It presumes that there would be no social, climatic, religious, scientific, geological, or sociological changes of any significance to alter radically

the nature of society in Europe. While this thesis seeks to determine whether television in Europe acted as a catalyst to stimulate integration, other scenarios are possible.

In one scenario, integration would decline as the Europeanization of television and the European nations are resisted and nation-states reaffirm their controls. In this scenario, satellite television would be developed in Europe, but nations would take steps to assure continued jurisdiction over this medium. In a second scenario, integration would develop simultaneously along two or more paths. Some nations would elect to limit their participation in the integration process, electing to retain national control over television policy and other aspects of their national life and culture. However, other nations would determine to proceed with integration on a regional or lesser scale. A third scenario would be the continuation of the situation as it existed in 1987. Integration would be acknowledged as a goal to be pursued, but national governments would retain national identity and individuality as a priority, thus restricting the development of integration.

Using the television industry in Europe in 1987 as a reference point, this thesis demonstrates the degree to which Europe lacked unity, particularly in the pre-satellite era. It will trace the development of television

throughout the continent and detail the policies and practices that evolved to govern its operations. The history of television in each European nation is cited as proof of the nationalistic nature of the television industry prior to 1987. This evolution resulted in markedly different and sometimes contradictory policies as each nation pursued television along individual lines. It is demonstrated that these non-complementary policies acted to discourage unification by reenforcing national loyalties, traditions, and customs. These were environmental factors in stage one of Etzioni's model. However, the introduction of satellite communications provided new challenges both to the television industry and the governments of Europe.

The role of IGOs involved with television is detailed as the elite groups of Europe acted to bring about more coordination of television policies. This was the second phase of unification in action. Outlined are the variable contributions of these IGOs to the integration process. Specific focus is given to the EC. Each branch is examined to reveal exactly how it approached television and how its actions affected integration.

Marketplace activities are surveyed from the development of television through the introduction of satellite communications. This represented stage three of Etzioni's model in which greater integration took place in

various sectors of Europe, as increased unification was achieved in more sectors.

Finally, an evaluation of the fourth stage in Etzioni's model as related to the television industry in Europe in 1987 is given. Indicators will be identified to measure the progress of integration, the impact television policy had on integration activities, and the proof of the thesis and alternative scenarios.

CHAPTER TWO
EUROPEAN TELEVISION AND
THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION

Since the beginning of recorded history, Europe had been a geographical territory encompassing many groups of people. They developed some shared customs and traditions, yet remained separated by language differences and by national, local, or regional customs and traditions. While people worldwide understood what it meant to be "European," Europe had never truly been united as a political entity.

The concept of a unified Europe inspired many distinguished writers, philosophers, historians, social scientists, and politicians throughout history. Voltaire, in the 18th century, wrote that Europe might be considered "one great republic, divided into several states."¹ Rousseau wrote that "today there are no more French, Germans, Spaniards, or even English. . . There are only Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same way of life."² In the nineteenth century, Victor

¹Cited in Denis de Rougement, The Idea of Europe, trans. by Norbert Guterman (New York: Meridian Books, 1968), p. 148.

²Ibid., p. 54.

Hugo wrote, "In the twentieth century there will be an extraordinary nation. . . It will be called Europe."³ Since the time of the Greek and Roman Empires, Europeans significantly influenced the world's economic and political life. At one time or other between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries, Europeans colonized and controlled vast parts of North and South America, Africa, Asia, as well as Australia and many of the world's islands. European nations expanded their kingdoms and empires while retaining unique rivalries and alliances. But after World War II these nations were no longer able to play a dominant role in world political, military, or economic spheres.

Many Europeans believed that Europe could regain initiative and become a major force in the world again by pooling the resources, peoples, and power of its nations. Leaders sought ways to increase a sensitivity to the interdependence of all Europeans and to develop combined European attitudes toward international issues. French diplomat, Jean Monnet, perhaps the most influential advocate of European unification, argued that only through greater political and economic unity could Europe escape future wars and fulfill its potential in the world.⁴ Efforts by Monnet and others such as Winston Churchill and

³ Ibid., p. 265.

⁴ Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1978), p. 272.

French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, led to the establishment of organizations such as the Council of Europe and the EC, which fostered unified European discussions of major concerns and solutions to a wide range of problems.

By the 1980s, the nations of Western Europe had achieved considerable progress toward unification. The continent was no longer dominated by the bitter rivalries and fragile alliances that had distinguished the region for centuries. In contrast, its nations were combining efforts in many notable ways. For example, they had formed the world's largest trading partnership.⁵ Europe spoke with one voice in many forums throughout the world in matters relative to trade, technological standards, and monetary policy. Nations within the EC often negotiated as a unit, and the EC itself maintained embassies worldwide. To a significant extent, these nations had become a common market and a unified force. Europeans proved that when they worked together as a unit and pooled their resources, they had an impact on the world that separately they could not have. The general public throughout Europe also recognized the positive contributions of a unified Europe. In 1987, thirty years after the signing of the Treaties of Rome, a public opinion poll found that most Europeans in

⁵ Commission of the European Communities, EUR 12: Diagrams of the Enlarged Community, 1986, p. 12. "Happy Birthday," The Economist, March 21, 1987, p. 67.

member-nations believed EC membership was good for their country. Furthermore, the majority also believed that the best way of preserving "national, cultural, historical identities" as well as the "national economic interests against the [challenges of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Japan, was] for the countries of Europe to become truly united." People in every member-nation embraced unification as the best course that could be taken for Europe's future.⁶ Yet, the inability of European governments to support the Europa project demonstrated that national governments could resist or ignore undertakings at their discretion, even if these efforts were undertaken to better Europe as a whole and were backed by Europe's leading IGOs. They had achieved Deutsch's broad definition of integration because they had demonstrated agreement that "common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change."⁷ But while there had been some shifting of "loyalties, expectations, and political activities" toward European centers, by Haas' definition these traits had not shifted to a "new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."⁸ National governments retained

⁶ "Poll Shows Popular Support of European Union," Europe, May 1987, pp. 28-29.

⁷ Deutsch, Political Community, p. 5.

⁸ Haas, The Uniting, p. 16.

jurisdiction over television policy. They appeared to be acting more like one of Etzioni's political systems with their activities interrelated rather than integrated.⁹ While IGOs such as the EC intended to create a market "without frontiers,"¹⁰ nations retained ultimate sovereignty and in matters such as television reserved the right to resist pan-European efforts in favor of actions that benefitted the nation.

Lord Cockfield and others recognized the important place television had during this time in history. To him, it was a central factor in shaping the future of Europe. As long as television remained under the control of national governments and television policy was nationally developed and administered, Europe would not achieve true unification.¹¹ To underscore the importance of television to the Community, the EC declared 1988 "European Cinema and Television Year." Ripa di Meana explained that this declaration was made because television played "a leading role in drawing the European Community closer together and, therefore, in the construction of Europe."¹²

Television's impact was heightened by the

⁹ Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 1-5.

¹¹ Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes Common Standards," p. 16.

¹² "Europe to Celebrate Cinema and TV in 1988," Europe, May 1987, pp. 41-42.

development of satellite communications which radically altered the nature of the television industry. In the pre-satellite era, television signals were relayed in one of three ways, all of which were able to be controlled by national governments. The first two were over-the-air broadcast signals and microwave relays. Both had ranges that could be limited by the amount of power and other attributes assigned by the national governments. The third was cable television, which was totally regulated by each national government.¹³ However, communications by means of satellites could not easily be confined to a limited territory. Once transmitted, a satellite signal could be received with equal clarity and immediacy throughout a broad geographical area. The only significant controlling factor for satellite reception was the presence of proper reception equipment. Government control over reception of satellite communications was limited to its ability to regulate the availability of this reception equipment.¹⁴

Television played a role in Europe comparable to the role communication played in other organizations. This process paralleled the activity that took place in society when existing organizations merged. In this application,

¹³ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 11-21.

¹⁴ Mark Lang, World Satellite Almanac, Second edition (Indianapolis: Howard W. Sams and Co., 1987), pp. 3-13.

Europe was the organization to be created, and television was the communications medium for relaying information. Conveying information accurately, effectively, and in a timely manner, was vital to the health of an organization by those who studied organizational behavior.¹⁵ The character of communication exposed the genuine conditions within an organization. Ineffective communication or significant gaps in intraorganizational communication were symptomatic of deeper problems and pointed to deficiencies in the nature of internal relationships.¹⁶ The result of these deficiencies often was fragmentation, disunity, and a lack of cohesiveness. These factors prohibited the kind of coordination required for growth and full development.¹⁷

Integration theorists agreed that communication was vital to the integration process. Deutsch, for example, concluded that communication helped cultivate the "unifying habits and institutions" necessary for integration. People depended on "mutual communication and predictability" to avoid threats and develop an ability to "depend on each other" and "view each other as partners rather than as threats." Deutsch viewed communication as

¹⁵ Fred Luthans, Organizational Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 205.

¹⁶ Douglas McGregor, The Professional Manager (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 151.

¹⁷ Peter F. Drucker, Technology Management and Society (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977), p. 23.

central to the existence of a "people," which he defined as "a community of shared meanings," or a group who shared habits of communication. And while these habits most often were formed among people with the same language, he concluded that "sometimes the common culture and communication habits, which make a people, may even spread to form a nation among groups that speak different languages." Thus to Deutsch the problem that many languages were spoken within a region did not present an insurmountable obstacle to integration. Deutsch also wrote that the "processes of communication are the basis of the coherence of societies, cultures, and even of the personalities of individuals." Communication facilitated the experience of a common history and perspective on events by a people, which helped unite them and give them a more shared world view.¹⁸ A major characteristic of membership in a group is "the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."¹⁹ Deutsch also drew attention to Norbert Wiener's comment that communication was "the cement that makes organizations. Communication alone enables a group to think together, to

¹⁸ Karl Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (New York: Archon Books, 1970), pp. 13, 33, 41, 58.

¹⁹ Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953), pp. 61, 70-71.

see together, and to act together."²⁰ Perhaps as much as it played a role in the establishment and fostering of integrated societies, the regulation or impeding of communication in many cases prevented integration. Communication patterns, habits, and activities could be contained to a significant degree to sources within national boundaries. Such controls reenforced past or existing loyalties and acted in some cases as barriers to integration, tending to limit interaction and prevent the exchanges required to achieve integration.²¹ Etzioni wrote that communication networks were indispensable for organizations and became more important the larger and more complex the organization. Information had to flow vertically through every level as well as horizontally from one part of the organization to another.

Television proved to be an important communications medium for Europe. Nation-states and European IGOs both sought increased jurisdiction over television policy. For the most part, television policy control remained with national governments. As the EP concluded, these controls tended to reenforce national allegiances. Citizens watched television programs produced or selected by and telecast

²⁰ Cybernetics, cited in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 424.

²¹ Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.

from organizations within that nation. They listened to radio programs and read books, newspapers, and magazines originating in their nation. The focus centered on national life, and perspectives developed within that framework. These communication activities created the "unifying habits and institutions" Deutsch used to describe the integration process.²² But since the focus of these habits and institutions was the nation, these activities reenforced national rather than European integration. While the nation-states of Europe enjoyed unity through their internal communication, nationally controlled television prevented continental integration efforts. They, in fact, established the communications barriers to integration to which Deutsch referred.²³ Those, such as the EC, who sought a European consciousness and integration realized that this system had to be changed and these barriers broken if Europe was to be unified. Thus both those desiring to retain national sovereignty and those desiring greater integration recognized the importance television had on life in Europe.

As a communications medium, television had demonstrated the ability to influence the nature of society itself. The power of this medium was observed by many noted analysts of trends in society. Marshall McLuhan, one

²²Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.

²³Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.

of the most influential analysts of communications, concluded that the introduction of television to society changed the way people acted and related to each other. It was a communications medium that affected nations and cultures and changed the character of organizations because it changed the relationships of people.²⁴

In explaining why television was deemed of such importance to society, futurist Alvin Toffler, one of the most widely read thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s, pointed to the role it played in creating every person's images of reality. Images were formed "out of the signals of information reaching us" from every part of the environment, including the mass media. When this environment changed, image formation was modified. Changes in communications media during the twentieth century significantly altered the way these images were formed.²⁵ The introduction of new communications technology transformed the role of communications in society and with these changes altered modern culture itself.²⁶ Toffler identified three primary waves in the development of communications technology. The first encompassed the

²⁴ Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (New York: Signet Books, 1964), p. 152.

²⁵ Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1980), p. 145.

²⁶ Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantom Books, 1970), pp. 280-2.

years before mass media were developed when a limited range of input such as neighbors, family, oral history, and personal experiences shaped world images. The second wave incorporated the development of the mass media. The creation of images was freed from dependence on the immediate environment since books, newspapers, magazines, radio, and television expanded the signals reaching people. In Europe, these media were usually oriented toward local or national perspectives, reenforcing models of reality centered on nation-states. The third wave was shaped by the introduction of such innovations as computers, video and audio tapes, cable television, and satellites. These innovations altered the way images were formed and resulted in increased choices for the individual. With more sources available, people could select information and entertainment that satisfied their individual interests and standards. While during the second wave Europeans received images influenced by nationally-oriented mass media, images in the third wave were received from an increasing number of sources from throughout the continent. The advent of the third wave came while people who had grown up during the second wave held dominant governmental positions in Europe. The changing media environment affected these people, as they yearned for the "ideological certainties of the past" and were "annoyed and disoriented by the information blitz of the new era." These people wanted to

retain the controls and certainty of the past, and resisted changes brought on by the third wave. This meant that national governments attempted to maintain the same level of control over media as they had before satellites.²⁷

Other studies confirmed the importance of television to modern society. For example, John Naisbitt, in his influential book, Megatrends, described western civilization's shift from an industrial base to a society primarily based on information. This shift began in 1956, the first year more Americans were employed in the information sector rather than in the production of goods. Naisbitt pointed to 1957 as "the beginning of the globalization of the information revolution," when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I. This also was the year in which the EC was founded, reflecting Europe's participation in the shift to more global perspectives. Expanding on McLuhan's belief that television would lead to "the global village," Naisbitt predicted that it would be the marriage of television with satellite technology that would lead to this era. Satellite television, with its capability to relay messages to vast areas of the world with unprecedented immediacy and quality, created the potential for vast socioeconomical and political change.²⁸

²⁷ Toffler, The Third Wave, pp. 145-154.

²⁸ John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner Books, 1982), pp. 12-13.

One of the leading theorists on global trends in business, Harvard Professor Theodore Levitt, believed that developments in communications technologies were primary causes of changes in the structure of business as well as society in general. Mass communications pressured established market segments and national controls in Europe, resulting in expanded consumer awareness and increased demand for diverse products. In spite of this pressure, European nations through the mid-1980s maintained tight controls over radio and television signals. Yet Levitt predicted that national governments were fighting a losing battle. He concluded that "in the past barriers against superior technologies and better economics have always fallen," and that the superior technology of mass communications, particularly television, would result in a more integrated European market.²⁹

Television demonstrated the power to influence the relationships of people to each other. While nation-states exercised considerable control over television before the satellite era, satellites introduced a new dimension to the medium. Fulfilling part of Haas' definition of integration,³⁰ satellite television became an environmental factor that helped shift the expectations of Europeans

²⁹Theodore Levitt, The Marketing Imagination (New York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 20, 31-32.

³⁰Haas, The Uniting, p. 16.

toward centers outside of their own nation. It also created greater interdependence among peoples and market segments throughout Europe, as Etzioni contended would take place in the first phase of unification. Television, particularly through satellites, offered the means through which communication throughout Europe could be more integrated, in turn leading to a more integrated Europe.

CHAPTER III
TELEVISION AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS:
REENFORCING THE ANCIENT LOYALTIES

If communication developed the "unifying habits and institutions" necessary for integration,¹ nationally-controlled television activities provided ample evidence that the nations of Europe were more interested in strengthening their own national integration than in encouraging the unification of Europe. They became aware that television brought with it the power to change relationships² as well as to influence the nature of images individuals formed toward politics, commercial products, fashion, and other aspects of society.³ Therefore television policy throughout Europe was developed along national lines, with distinctive policies even in neighboring countries.

Television service began in most European countries

¹ Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.

² McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. 152

³ Toffler, The Third Wave, p. 145.

in the decade between 1944 and 1954. For example, television service started in France in 1944, in the U.K. in 1946, in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952, and in Italy in 1953. Strong government control and supervision were constant in each nation, but the exact nature of this control varied. The following sections summarize the development of television in each of the nations of western Europe.

Austria

Austria had two television services, ÖRF1 and ÖRF2, both operated by Österreichischer Rundfunk (ÖRF), the state broadcasting authority. Both stations carried advertising. Austria encouraged the development of cable television, particularly following 1977 when distribution of foreign programs in the country was legalized. It also participated in the development of some pan-European satellite communications projects.⁴

Belgium

Belgium had a television policy that reflected its political status as a nation sharply divided over language. A 1963 law established four regions to govern the country, with the divisions based primarily on language differences. The areas were those regions where the Flemish (Dutch), Walloon (French), and German populations were concentrated,

⁴Gray, Cable Television, pp. 80-81.

with the capital of Brussels given special status.⁵ While all broadcasting was considered a public service with national implications, three separate institutions were given jurisdiction over television policy: Radio Télévision Belge de la Communauté Culturelle Française (RTBF) for the Walloon community; Belgische Radio en Televisie (BRT) for the Flemish community; and Belgisches Rundfunk und Fernsehzentrum für deutschsprachige Sendungen (BRF) for the Germany community. Each were public corporations governed by a board of directors appointed by the minister of cultural affairs for the appropriate language group. All finances were overseen by the national government. No advertising was permitted. The RTBF and BRF granted television time to private, non-profit organizations which met the criteria established by law.⁶

Belgium had the highest penetration of cable television households of any nation in Europe, with nearly ninety percent of its households wired for cable reception.⁷ However, its policy of no advertising on television meant that television services based elsewhere in Europe that carried advertising were not permitted on systems in Belgium. Pressure mounted through the 1980s for

⁵ Gray, Cable Television, p. 83.

⁶ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 74-75.

⁷ "Belgium: the Programmers' Battlefield," Cable and Satellite Europe, September 1986, p. 15.

Belgium to reverse this policy, particularly since it was the home nation for the EC. Belgium's intricate governmental structure mandated that each language-centered regional government had to approve new legal frameworks.⁸

In Flanders, the process of new media law development brought the region close to a new law in 1987. The new policy called for a new Flemish commercial television station with several restrictions in ownership and program content. Expressing a concern for the Flemish and overall Belgium culture, the new policy was to demand that a significant percentage of television channels carried on cable systems in the area be Flemish.⁹ Similar action was expected in Walloon with corresponding protection for the Walloon culture. Progress toward a more open commercial policy remained in study.¹⁰

Some satellite television services were allowed into Belgium, but they had to agree to commit to program production in Belgium through a minimum investment arrangement administered by the government.¹¹

Belgian television policies changed during the

⁸ "Belgium Stalls on Media Law," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 33.

⁹ "Government Moves on Flemish Private Channel," Cable and Satellite Express, June 26, 1987, p. 4.

¹⁰ "Programmers Battlefield," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 15.

¹¹ Ibid.

1980s, but the country's political and social climate continued to dominate television policy. The divisions and conflicts between the Flemish and Walloon areas in particular overshadowed most other political activities. Belgians seemed to be more concerned about the protection of their own cultures than with encouraging television services from other nations, or with television activities that might encourage European integration.

Denmark

Denmark was one of the staunch advocates of government monopoly over television activities. Danmarks Radio had the exclusive rights to television distribution in Denmark, and was Denmark's only television service. All advertising was prohibited.¹² However, after many years of intense debate this situation changed in early 1986. At that time the Danish government approved the creation of a new television station, which was to be supported by advertising. The new station was to be overseen by a five-member board selected by the Danish Ministry of Culture, which intended to maintain a public service focus rather than allow the station to become focused on the presentation of entertainment programs.¹³

Other changes were also made in a modest

¹² Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 98.

¹³ Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Denmark," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p. 20.

liberalization program. In early 1987, the Danish government for the first time approved the reception of satellite television services by cable systems in Denmark. This was part of Denmark's on-going effort to provide extensive cable service throughout the country. It was projected that by the early 1990s 80 percent of Danish households would have cable television.¹⁴

Denmark was typical of the nations of Europe which reluctantly embraced satellite television. It opened its borders to satellite services and endorsed advertising as a legitimate form of supporting television service only after years of resistance. Yet, Denmark remained concerned about protecting its culture, and maintain a cautious approach to the introduction of new services and the approval of advertising.

Finland

Finland's state broadcasting company, Oy Yleisradio (YLE), owned and operated two television stations, YLE-1 and YLE-2, both supported by subscriptions. YLE leased time to an independent company, Oy Mainos TV Reklam Ab (MTV), which aired advertising-backed programs. A third channel was started in 1986 as a joint venture between YLE and MTV. More than half of the homes in Finland were connected to master antennae (MATV) system. In MATV set-

¹⁴ "Denmark Opens Up," Cable and Satellite Express, April 3, 1987, p. 1.

ups, one master antennae received programming from television services and then transmitted the signals through cables to dwelling units for viewing in individual households. Cable television was also encouraged. Reception of satellite television from other nations and purchase of home satellite dishes were allowed with few restrictions.¹⁵ Finland was a minor partner with Sweden and Norway in a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) project called Tele-X which was conceived as a means of providing television service to the remote populations throughout the region. However, its involvement was tempered by concern about the Soviet Union. Finland desired to stay on good terms with this giant neighbor, and therefore proceeded cautiously with commercial and satellite television projects.¹⁶

France

The 1980s were a time of challenge and change for the mass media in France. Since the inception of official television service, television had been a state monopoly, and as such was accused of being used, often blatantly, by the ruling government for its own ends. Charles de Gaulle once said, "My opponents have much of the press on their

¹⁵ Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Finish New Media: On Ice?," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p. 22.

¹⁶ Taylor, "Battle," pp. 32-33.

side, so I keep television." His successor, Georges Pompidou, also expressed the view that television was important not just as a political instrument but also as a resource for the preservation of French culture. He said, "French television is the Voice of France," and wanted to retain as much control of it as possible.¹⁷

The organization responsible for television between 1964 and 1974, the Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF), was often charged with bias, subjected to strikes, and in 1974 was replaced by seven more independent companies financed by the state: four overseeing broadcasting programming (three for television programs and one for radio); the Société Française de Production (responsible for all radio and television production); the Institut de l'Audiovisuel (for training of professionals for audio-visual work); and Télédiffusion de France or TDF. TDF provided general oversight of all broadcasting activities. However, this arrangement did not end complaints. Groups and individuals from all political philosophies levied attacks on government control.¹⁸

After the election of Socialist François Mitterrand as President in 1981, French media policies changed. A new audiovisual law, passed in 1982, established a nine-member

¹⁷Roger Williams, "France: A Revolution in the Making," Channels, September 1985, p. 60.

¹⁸Gray, Cable Television, p. 97.

supervisory group, the Haute Autorité, to oversee all broadcasting activities. This structure, however, was subject to the same criticisms of political favoritism as previous procedures.¹⁹

TDF itself, as a public corporation, was governed by a sixteen member board, including representatives from Parliament and the High Authority for Audio-Visual Communications. The three networks overseen by TDF were: Télévision Française 1 (TF 1), Antenne 2 (A 2), and France-Régions 3 (FR 3). A separate organization, the Régie Française de Publicité (RFP), attracted advertising and produced commercials. Slightly more than half of RFP was owned by the government, with the remainder owned by representatives of the advertising industry, the press, consumers, and another French state holding company, the Société Financière de Radiodiffusion, or Sofirad. Regardless of claims of independence, representatives of the state were involved in each of these organizations, providing state direction, both subtle and direct.²⁰

Mitterrand led France into the era of pay television by approving the development of Canal Plus, a subscription television (STV) service delivered via microwaves to dwelling units paying for descrambling equipment.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 98.

²⁰ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 89-91.

But one of the biggest surprises of his government came in May of 1985, when Prime Minister Laurent Fabius announced that France was going to embrace private television, with expanded advertising acceptability, new national services, and sixty-two local services.²¹ The new national services were to be called La Cinq, TV6, and TV7.²²

More furor was created in November 1985 when the government awarded the license for La Cinq to a conglomerate controlled by Italian media mogul Silvio Berlusconi and French industrialist Jérôme Seydoux. In addition, British media multi-millionaire, Robert Maxwell was given a license to operate an English-language service on the high powered TDF-1 satellite France was developing. Simultaneously, the government refused to honor a commitment it had previously made to award a transponder on this satellite to Luxembourg's CLT. Within the same week, a bill was pushed through a sparsely attended National Assembly which allowed the government to use the Eiffel Tower and other buildings for television transmission purposes. This bill infuriated Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac, a political adversary and ideological opposite of Mitterrand.²³

²¹ "French TV Begins to Take New Shape," Cable and Satellite Express, May 31, 1985, p. 16.

²² Claire Wilson, "Crisis Looms Over French TV," Advertising Age, March 10, 1986, p. 56.

²³ "Political Furor Sweeping France," Variety, November 27, 1985, pp. 121, 135.

Television policy became one of the major issues of the French elections of 1986, and continued as a major political matter following the election when Chirac became prime minister, setting up an unprecedented scenario in France--a Socialist president, Mitterrand, had a Conservative prime minister, Chirac. One of the first actions of Chirac's government was to cancel franchises awarded for TDF-1 transponders, and establish a new, independent organization, called the CNCL, to oversee the implementation of private television in France. In July 1986, the government revoked the licenses given to La Cinq and TV6. However, a new communications bill was debated throughout 1986, and the outcome remained clouded by continuing uncertainty, as well as shifting political and market forces.²⁴ In spite of this on-going turmoil, France continued to develop its TDF-1 high powered satellite project, which was to have been launched in 1986, but was delayed for technical and financial reasons. Early in 1987, Finance Minister Alain Juppe concluded that TDF-1 was too expensive to launch and operate. Since this project was developed in cooperation with West Germany, concerns were raised about the consequences of delaying the project. Eventually its continued development was approved.²⁵

²⁴ "Compromises on French Media Law," Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1986, p. 5.

²⁵ "Political Storm Brewing for TDF," Cable and Satellite Europe, March 1987, p. 8.

To add to this complex domestic television environment, in 1985 two EP members took the French government into the European Court of Justice on the charge that French media laws violated the Treaty of Rome, which established the EC.²⁶

The French were one of the most visible and vocal participants in the development of European IGOs and projects for the strengthening of Europe's position in international political and economical spheres. They were a leading force in the evolution of pan-European television activity as well. But French television policies were marked by lingering internal political disputes, and their television policies changed several times. They also seemed to remain more concerned about protecting their culture and language than advancing European integration through television.

Federal Republic of Germany

Like Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) took a regional approach to television policy in conformation with its federal system of government. Authority for German television policy was designated specifically to the eleven Länder, or states. Acting alone or together with other Länder, the government of each Land assigned responsibility for broadcasting within its region

²⁶ "EEC Attacks French Media Law," Cable and Satellite Europe, September 1985, p. 6.

to a non-profit public corporation. Nine regional television stations were established, with a tenth--Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF)--established under an agreement among the states. Each station was independent, with limited government supervision. They were managed by broadcasting and administrative boards which included representatives of the major political, religious, and philosophical groups in the state.²⁷

West Germany designated three channels for use by its individual stations. Channel One was a national service conducted as a joint venture among the nine regional stations. Its programming consisted of a mix of programs from individual stations coordinated by the association of public broadcasting corporations (ARD). ZDF broadcasted on Channel Two. Channel Three was dedicated to broadcasts of five different regional services.²⁸

This regional organizational structure was created following World War II and was designed to prevent the domination of Germany by one person or group, as Hitler and the National Socialists had done. While this structure prevented political dominance by one group, it also prevented or limited the development and implementation of national television policies, and delayed German partici-

²⁷ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 94-95.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 95.

pation in the satellite television explosion of the 1980s. While Länder control remained in effect for television, the national post office (or Bundespost) retained a monopoly on the installation of cable television as well as all post and telecommunications services.²⁹

This complicated arrangement caused numerous attempts to work out new ways to approach the issue of satellite television within West Germany. Years of negotiations resulted in a new treaty signed on April 3, 1987, by the media representatives of each Land. The treaty provided for the creation of private television in West Germany, to coexist with public television. Yet Germany remained a long way from achieving a fully integrated policy toward television.³⁰

In the face of these internal obstacles, West Germany remained active in the creation of a new satellite service for Europe. In a joint project with France, the Germans planned to launch a service called TV-SAT, with a satellite technology duplicating France's projected TDF-1 satellite. The German satellite was scheduled to beam programming in German to Germany and was not designed to reach the greater European market.³¹

²⁹ Gray, Cable Television, p. 106.

³⁰ "Media Treaty Signed," Cable and Satellite Express, Vol. 4, No. 7, p. 4.

³¹ Chapman, New Media, p. 17.

Although West Germany became Europe's strongest economic power after World War II, its own governmental fragmentation within its federal system significantly contributed to its slow growth in cable television as well as to its inability to take a leadership role in television. In contrast to such smaller countries as Luxembourg and the Netherlands, West Germany had such complex media regulations that it had not played as significant a role as one would assume from a nation of its size and economic clout. Germans, in a sense, spent their energies on being integrated in their own nation and were not concerned about the problems of European integration through satellite communications.

Greece

According to the Greek Constitution of 1975, television was "under the immediate control of the State." This provision was made to assure news and information reports that were impartial by the government's standards, and to assure that program quality and content were in line with the "social mission and the cultural development of the country." This policy was in accord with the Greek government's socialist orientation. Greek law established two organizations to operate television stations: Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorasses (ERT 1 -Greek Radio and Television) and Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassis (ERT 2). ERT 1 was financed by a broadcasting fee levied on all television

sets and advertising, while ERT 2 was funded from the national budget and through advertising. The board of directors of ERT 1 consisted of seven members appointed by the cabinet, while ERT 2 was managed by a five member board appointed by the Ministry of the Presidency.³² Greece was not active in the development of cable television and did not play a major role in pan-European satellite efforts.

Ireland

Ireland's national broadcasting organization, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE), was the only organization licensed for television service in Ireland by its Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. It operated two television stations (RTE-1 and RTE-2), both of which accepted advertising. Advertising accounted for slightly less than half of its revenues. RTE also received substantial funding from the Irish Parliament out of funds designated for the Ministry. The authority for the RTE was vested in a nine-member board appointed by the government.³³

Cable television installations increased during the early 1980s. However, most of the cable systems were capable of receiving only six channels, and those six channels were almost exclusively reserved for BBC-1, BBC-2,

³² Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 101-3.

³³ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 86-87.

and Channel Four from the U.K., Ulster TV from Northern Ireland, and RTE-1 and RTE-2. Few of Ireland's cabled households received any of the satellite television networks, and major rebuilding of the cable systems was required for this situation to change.³⁴

In spite of its relatively small size, Ireland took steps to become one of Europe's most advanced telecommunications centers in the 1980s. In December 1986, its government approved the construction of the Eiresat satellite system. Eiresat was to be a high-powered satellite with five channels capable of being seen throughout Ireland, the U.K., and the western part of continental Europe. The satellite was also to be used by the RTE.³⁵ Ireland determined to enter the satellite era in an aggressive way.³⁶

Italy

Frequent leadership changes and corresponding shifts in national policy were characteristic of post World War II Italy. Television policy was no less unstable. Yet by the mid-1980s, while the rest of Europe only gradually expanded the number of available television services and studied increased television privatization, Italy had more

³⁴O'Connor, "Ireland," p. 29.

³⁵Lang, World Satellite Almanac, pp. 229-30.

³⁶Vanessa O'Connor, "Ireland's Satellite Jig," Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1986, pp. 28-29.

than 600 television stations, most of which were private.

Prior to the 1970s, Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI) monopolized airwaves with its state-owned public service programming. However, on April 30, 1971, a local cable network began operating in the small, northwestern Italy city of Biella. In the next few years, other networks began similar operations elsewhere in Italy. In 1974 the Italian minister of communication ruled these networks illegal, but in July of that year the Constitutional Court of Italy decreed them legal. In 1976 the court extended this freedom of operation to over-the-air, broadcasting stations, spawning a massive growth in available television services. Due in part to the many changes in government, no media law was passed to take the place of the one rejected by the court in 1974. Most of the 600-plus stations attracted comparatively small audiences, and the three RAI stations, RAI One, RAI Two, and RAI Three, remained the only official national television services. In 1980 Silvio Berlusconi started the first of his "national networks" through distribution of videocassettes to stations throughout Italy. By 1986 he had amassed three networks: Canale Cinque, Italia Uno, and Retequattro. Other networks were created through similar packaging of local stations, principal among which were Euro-TV, Rete A, and Video Music. Tele Monte Carlo from Monaco was allowed to be telecast in Italy through special arrangement with

the Italian government.³⁷

A legal battle continued in Italy based on RAI's legal position as the "only legitimate operator of national broadcasting," a definition affirmed by the Constitutional Court in 1981.³⁸ The court ruled that other organizations could not create national networks, and in 1984 a Turin judge ruled that the networks operated by Berlusconi were violating the law. These networks were allowed to continue operations at least until appeals could be filed. A state holding company, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), held 99.55% of all RAI shares. Advertising since 1972 was the responsibility of the Societa Publicita Radiofonica e Televisiva (SIPRA), which was a profit-making public company. Government monopoly of national television service was justified due to the need to provide "essential public service of pre-eminent general interest." However, the ministry for posts and telecommunications was ordered to grant licenses with only three major stipulations: (1) advertising could not exceed five percent of total airtime; (2) local stations could not be linked into national networks; and (3) station operators had to produce at least half of their own programs.³⁹

³⁷ "More Channels than Dishes," Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1986, p. 13.

³⁸ Gray, Cable Television, p. 115.

³⁹ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 65-67.

Italian television emphasized multiple consumer choices before the dawn of the satellite era. Court actions in the 1970s created a deregulated environment, resulting in the development of more stations than any other nation in Europe. However, some observers concluded from the Italian experience that Europe must continue to regulate television activities and that government controls over television were needed.⁴⁰

Luxembourg

Luxembourg, with a population of under 400,000 and a territory of only 998 square miles, became one of the most influential nations in Europe concerning television. Much of its disproportional influence stemmed from its government's approach to television. Authority was given to a public company, known as Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion (CLT), with a commission to make a financial profit. CLT did business under the name of Radio-Tele-Luxembourg (RTL). RTL paid the Luxembourg government levies based on its license fees as well as a fee for continuing its status as a monopoly.⁴¹

Luxembourg was characterized by one observer as Europe's "main 'offshore' TV broadcaster, beaming commer-

⁴⁰ Jean-Marie Cavada, speech delivered at the Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 16, 1986.

⁴¹ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 63-64.

cial TV and radio services into neighboring countries and making its advertising money on the basis of foreign audiences."⁴² CLT had more freedom and authority than most European broadcasting organizations. In contrast to countries like the Netherlands where broadcasting control was vested in organizations concerned with preserving the national culture, CLT had primarily commercial aims. Most of its viewing audience came from Luxembourg's more populated neighboring countries. It programmed in the Luxembourgian language only about an hour a day, otherwise televising in French for its main RTL service and in German for its RTL-Plus service.⁴³ Ownership of CLT was pan-European, split among several private firms and governmental groups, including the Société Générale de Belgique, Agency Havas (France), and the Banque Internationale à Luxembourg.⁴⁴

As a result of its more commercial, less restrictive approach to television, Luxembourg had headquartered several television ventures, including CLT itself, with the goal of broadcasting to audiences throughout Europe. In the satellite era, Luxembourg became home to the Coronet

⁴² "Time of Reckoning for CLT," Cable and Satellite Europe, September 1986, p. 23.

⁴³ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 63-64.

⁴⁴ "Reckoning," Cable and Satellite Europe, September 1986, p. 23.

project, conceived in 1983, as the first private pan-European satellite television service. Coronet was established in Luxembourg in part because the government promised significant political and technical support. The Luxembourg government later took over more control of Coronet through an organization called the Société Européenne des Satellites (SES).⁴⁵ Coronet ceased to exist in 1984, due to mounting costs and organizational difficulties. However, SES sustained the essence of this concept in a project begun in 1985 called "Astra." Astra was backed by fourteen partners from throughout Europe dedicated to private satellite-delivered television to the continent.⁴⁶

Ironically, even though the government of Luxembourg was involved in these independent ventures, it continued to support public pan-European television and satellite enterprises. But it was criticized for this apparent double-mindedness. Luxembourg's sponsorship of Coronet and Astra projects caused political trouble with other European nations and IGOs. It was publicly chastised by Eutelsat, which claimed a monopoly on international television distribution in Europe.⁴⁷ Eutelsat President

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 33.

⁴⁶ Société Européenne des Satellites, Sales brochure, (Luxembourg: SES, 1985).

⁴⁷ Simon Lloyd, "Eutelsat Closes Ranks," Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1984, p. 10.

Andrea Caruso called it "inconceivable that a government with a strong commitment to Europeanism" like Luxembourg could support such independent ventures.⁴⁸

Differences in television policy caused conflicts between Luxembourg and France as well. A 1984 agreement between the two countries assured the RTL two transponders on a new satellite being developed by the French.⁴⁹

However, in 1986 that agreement was nullified by French President Mitterrand, who awarded the transponders to other organizations. Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jacques Santer said this "blatant" violation badly damaged "the spirit of confidence" between the two countries. The continuing differences over television developments increased tensions between these nations.⁵⁰

In many ways Luxembourg embraced integration, but its willingness to encourage private television ventures indicated its continuing commitment to an independent course in Europe.

Monaco

Even though Monaco occupied less than one square mile of territory and had fewer than 30,000 inhabitants,

⁴⁸ Glyndwr Matthias, "The Monopoly Strikes Back," Cable and Satellite Europe, March 1987, p. 40.

⁴⁹ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 64.

⁵⁰ Alan Osborn, "Dispute Over Airwaves," Europe, June 1986, p. 8.

its broadcasting activities exercised influence throughout Europe. Radio Monte Carlo broadcast in more than twenty languages and was heard throughout the world. Its government-owned, commercial television station, Tele Monte Carlo, was viewed by audiences in France and Italy, where the governments authorized its reception. Monaco was not involved in any European satellite television developments. Because of its unique tax and business climate, it served a role in southern Europe somewhat similar to Luxembourg's in northern Europe as a haven for commercial broadcasting with limited government interference and regulations.⁵¹

The Netherlands

Television in the Netherlands was controlled by the Dutch Broadcasting Foundation ("Nederlandse Omroep Stichting," or NOS), which was considered a public law foundation, governed by a board of directors. Half of the board was appointed by private Dutch broadcasting organizations, with the other half split between appointees of Dutch cultural organizations and the Dutch minister for cultural affairs. The NOS had to allocate television time to broadcasting organizations, political parties, and religious organizations which met criteria in demonstrating public demand for their programs. When an organization reached a certain level of memberships, it qualified for

⁵¹ "Foreign Broadcasting Chart," Variety, April 15, 1987, p. 150.

air time. Groups with larger membership bases received more desirable air time. Operations were financed by a mix of license fees, contributions from broadcasting organizations, and advertising, which was regulated by the Foundation for Broadcast Advertising.⁵²

Cable television in the Netherlands was legalized in 1965. From the beginning the Dutch sought to make cable and broadcast television a servant of the public good, rather than a source of profit. To be cabled, a community had to demonstrate that at least 70 percent of its citizens wanted cable television. Local government municipalities exercised a significant control over programming content as well as operations of each cable system.⁵³ For example, 51 percent of the 300,000 subscriber system in Amsterdam was owned by the city of Amsterdam, with 48 percent owned by an organization of local housing associations.⁵⁴

Cable television systems in the Netherlands were allowed to retransmit television programming services from other European countries. However, to be carried on Dutch cable systems, non-Dutch services had to comply with strict standards. Dutch laws prohibited the reception of television signals (whether in the form of programs or adver-

⁵² Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 69-70.

⁵³ Gray, Cable Television, pp. 119-20.

⁵⁴ Michael Chapman and David Wood, The New Media Review (London: Ogilvie and Mather, 1984), p. 22.

tising) which were aimed exclusively at the Netherlands. The goal of this policy was the protection of the Dutch culture from outside influences. In 1984, after intense review, the Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs issued a revised policy document which summarized revisions required because of technological developments such as satellite communications and cable television. This document outlined three fundamental tasks to which the Dutch government was committed: (1) protecting the freedom and diversity of its media; (2) protecting and increasing the awareness of Dutch cultural achievements; and (3) expanding the number of programming choices for the consumer.⁵³

While the government expressed its desire to satisfy consumer demand for more choice, this ranked lower in priority than the protection of the Dutch media and culture. The government was dedicated to preserve the Dutch way of life and to control television in order to accomplish this. It determined to protect everything "old and deeply rooted" in its society worth saving and revitalizing. Commercialism could be increased to respond to popular demand for increased programming choices. However, the government warned that technology must not be allowed to rule society. The government vowed to

⁵³Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, Policy Document on the Media (The Netherlands, 1984), p. 2.

"guarantee protection of those values which, in the light of its other policies, it does not wish to expose to untrammelled social and technical development." To the government, these values were more important than commercial gain or blind acquiescence to pan-Europeanism. Television was important to further Dutch culture and events in European television were potential threats to the health of this culture. Overall Dutch "values, firms and products" lost ground to other influences and developments "detrimental to our culture, employment and store of knowledge." The Dutch vowed to fight this erosion through financial and legal means that would aid Dutch companies and individuals, and its overall society. This concern for the protection of Dutch autonomy did not mean the closing of Dutch frontiers, but the government warned that foreign programmers would be required to comply with Dutch laws, including the prohibition of advertising aimed at the Netherlands. The government remained adamant on this point. For them, involvement in pan-European or regional television ventures was conditional on the prohibition of this kind of advertising and the protection of Dutch culture.⁵⁶

At the same time, the Dutch remained active in the development of pan-European satellite television. They were the host country for Europa and participated in other

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 10, 17-20.

pan-European television undertakings. They remained, however, preeminently concerned about protecting their culture and heritage, apparently holding these in higher regard than European integration. Some saw these commitments as contradictory. For example, Dutch EP member, Gijs de Vries, argued successfully before the European Court of Justice that Dutch protectionism violated the Treaty of Rome which established the EC. The Court agreed with his argument and ordered the Dutch government to change its media laws to comply with the Treaty.⁵⁷ This and other challenges to Dutch policies were forcing the Netherlands to decide how much of their heritage and tradition they were willing to forsake. How willingly would they conform to European standards instead of protecting their own? Their answer was to determine how the Netherlands fit into Europe's future.

Norway

Norway had one of the most restrictive television policies in Europe. Its one television station operated without advertising and had careful government oversight. Yet Norway became a leader in the use of satellites to bring television to its sparsely populated northern region.⁵⁸ Through its 15 percent ownership in the Tele-X

⁵⁷ Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 23.

⁵⁸ Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "The Norwegian Picture," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p. 16.

DBS satellite project it developed with Sweden and Finland, Norway hoped to expand its service to this remote territory.⁵⁹

The creation of a second television station and the approval of advertising were subjects that were hotly debated throughout the 1980s. Socialists favored retaining an advertising ban, while Conservatives sought expanded commercialism and advertising on the broadcast media. Overall, Norway remained cautious regarding television expansion. The government was aware that the nation historically lived in the shadow of its more powerful neighbors, principally Sweden. While seeking practical relations in various projects of the Scandinavian countries, Norway was conservative in its media policies as its way of preserving its culture and guarding against too great an influence from Sweden and other countries.⁶⁰

Portugal

Portugal joined the EC in 1986, ending years of relative isolation from the rest of Europe. Television had always been state-owned and controlled, although advertising was permitted. The state's broadcasting administrator, the RTVP, owned two stations, TVP-1 and TVP-2. A proposal was before the government to allow private

⁵⁹Doreen Taylor, "Battle in the Sky Over Scandinavia," Broadcast, October 31, 1986, pp. 32-33.

⁶⁰Baker, "Norwegian," p. 16.

stations in the country. It had not encouraged the development of cable television and did not actively pursue satellite communications for Portugal.⁶¹

Spain

Spain emerged from decades of dominance by Francisco Franco upon his death in 1975. Television, like most other aspects of Spanish life, had been tightly controlled by Franco's government. With the accession of King Juan Carlos, Spain opened new contacts with the outside world, adopted a democratic constitution, and joined the EC. This liberalization carried over into television. Most of the country received only two television channels, each operated by Radiotelevision Espanola (RTVE), Spain's state-owned broadcasting corporation. Three stations were operated by the regional governments Galicia, the Basque country, and Catalonia. Advertising was permitted on all stations.⁶² A new media law, approved by Spain's Council of Ministers on April 3, 1987, allowed the development of private television in Spain. The new law prohibited any person or organization from owning more than 25 percent of a network.⁶³

⁶¹ Chapman, New Media, p. 22. Gray, Cable TV, p. 70.

⁶² "Marina Specht, 'Lady of Spain,'" Electronic Media, April 20, 1987, pp. G3, G17.

⁶³ Peter Besas, "Private TV in Spain Gets 'Okay'," Variety, April 15, 1987, p. 1.

Spain was not active in developing cable television or utilizing satellite communications. However, RTVE director Pilar Miro pledged to increase Spanish programming production and to foster new initiatives to upgrade television quality and standards. She was committed to Spanish program production, concentrating on programs "that preserve our national cultural identity and our European heritage."⁶⁴ Spain's entry into the EC set in motion a new openness and freedom for television. Efforts made since this entry demonstrated its willingness to change and adapt to the new era of satellite communications.

Sweden

The Sveriges Radio AB (Swedish Broadcasting Corporation) controlled two television stations, SVT-1 and SVT-2. Both were financed by subscription license fees.⁶⁵ With half of Swedish dwelling units formed into blocks of flats, master antennae television systems (MATV) owned by local authorities or housing associations became significant market factors. These MATV operators developed significant power in the Swedish television industry because of the number of people subscribing to them.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Specht, "Lady," p. 63.

⁶⁵ Foreign Broadcast Chart, Variety, April 15, 1987, p. 150.

⁶⁶ Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Sweden Sets Pace," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p. 15.

The tradition of MATV influence was a factor in several television-related activities in Sweden. More satellite receive dishes for home use (HTVRO, or television receive only for home reception) were available in Sweden than any other European nation. The Swedish government had one of the least restrictive policies in Europe for dish ownership, which was a leading factor in HTVRO growth. Televerket, Sweden's PTT, also sought to encourage the development of cable television. This development put Televerket in direct competition with MATV operators for television distribution to consumers.⁶⁷

Sweden was a leader in the development of a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) project for Scandinavia, called Tele-X. Scheduled for launch in 1988, this satellite was owned by the governments of Sweden, Norway, and Finland, with Sweden's share being a dominant 82 percent. Sweden's development and backing of Tele-X was indicative of Sweden's commitment to the development of satellite television, but its participation was primarily to serve the Scandinavian community rather than the rest of Europe.⁶⁸

Considerable uncertainty surrounded Sweden's direction in broadcast television. In the 1980s, Sweden considered adding another television station and approving

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Taylor, "Battle," pp. 32-33.

advertising on all Swedish stations. Sweden's strong Socialist parties opposed this kind of commercialism, while conservatives encouraged it. In September 1987, the Socialist party once again voted to continue the ban on advertising.⁶⁹

Switzerland

Although politically non-aligned and not part of the EC, Switzerland was a vital part of western Europe's television marketplace. The private Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) was licensed by the government to direct television and other broadcasting activities. The SBC operated three services, one for each major language group (German, French, and Italian). The Swiss PTT handled program transmission and the collection of license fees which financed the programming.⁷⁰

Switzerland's geographical location played a role in shaping its approach to television. Swiss received television programs from neighboring France, Germany, and Italy. It began developing cable television in the early 1960s primarily to improve television reception in mountainous area. Due to aggressive development of cable television, more than half of the Swiss households were connected to MATV systems. Cable systems were licensed by

⁶⁹Jack Burton, "Swedes Rejecting TV Ads," Advertising Age, October 5, 1987, p. 28.

⁷⁰Gray, Cable Television, p. 135.

the PTT, which determined which satellite networks were made available.⁷¹

A referendum was held in December 1984 concerning television policy, and as a result, the government began to consider proposals to create new stations and introduce advertising on television. While the Swiss people in general expressed their desire for these changes, some leaders voiced concerns on the impact of new television services (including satellite networks from other countries) on Swiss traditional values and way of life.⁷²

The United Kingdom

Television in the U.K. operated under governmental directives that dated back to 1926, when the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was established by the Home Secretary. The BBC operated two networks (BBC1 and BBC2) and was supported by a tax on television sets in the U.K. No advertising was allowed. In 1954, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) was established. It operated two networks: ITV and Channel Four. IBA programs were produced by member stations located throughout the U.K. Its networks were advertiser supported.⁷³

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "More Swiss Channels," Cable and Satellite Europe, April 1986, p. 27.

⁷³ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 79-81. Gray, Cable TV, pp. 138-39.

The BBC was under the direction of a board of governors, whose members, chairman, and deputy chairman were appointed by the Home Secretary. It was required to provide television programs "as a public service for disseminating information, education, and entertainment."⁷⁴ This stable system and the high quality of programming produced made British television much admired throughout Europe and the world. The consistent ability of the BBC and IBA to provide entertainment and information programs with variety and high standards was a key reason cable television and DBS ventures did not attract significant momentum in the U.K. Several British pay television services went bankrupt due to lack of subscribers and viewers, and high costs. Cable television companies also experienced financial difficulties.⁷⁵

However, the U.K. became the headquarters for several of the most influential television networks of the early satellite television era, including Sky Channel and the SuperChannel. The success of these ventures, coupled with widespread availability of American programs in Europe, caused concern in other European nations. Some felt that pan-European satellite programming would become a vehicle for English language dominance and that European unity would mean establishment of English as the language

⁷⁴ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 79.

⁷⁵ Gray, Cable TV, p. 139.

of Europe.⁷⁶

The public in general seemed satisfied with the quality of British television, but operational costs of these services continued to increase. The Thatcher government commissioned a special committee under the direction of Professor Alan Peacock to study the future of television in the U.K., particularly the BBC. The Peacock Commission released its report in July 1986. It called for gradual changes in the financing of the BBC. In the first phase, a system like that in existence would continue. But in an effort to keep costs in line, budgets and expenses would be indexed to inflation. Funding would continue to be based on the license fees fixed for each television set. The second phase was to follow toward the end of the century. In this phase the BBC would become a subscription service. Its television signal would be encoded and viewers would need to pay for proper equipment to receive its programs. The Commission recommended all television sets sold or rented in the U.K. after 1988 be equipped for encryption and that all restrictions for the reception of pay services and programming from other EC nations and be removed. The Commission report became the focal point for the debate on the future of television in the U.K.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Brenda Maddox, "Sky King," Channels, January/February 1986, pp. 53-55.

⁷⁷Glyndwr Matthias, "For the Birds?," Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1986, pp. 36-37.

Because of its tradition of high standards in program production and service, and because of the encouragement of its government, the U.K. became a leader in the development of European television. The most successful pan-European television services were English-language services based there, and many of the foremost leaders in pan-European television were from the U.K. The government had not encouraged public spending in these developments but had focused on the role of the private sector. Its actions in encouraging private ventures seemed to guarantee a leadership role for the English language in the development of European television.

Summary

This survey of television policies in eighteen nations of western Europe recounts the individuality of their approaches to television from the time of the inauguration of television service in the 1940s and 1950s through 1987. Television was a state monopoly in France, Spain, Belgium, and Denmark. The private sector was given control in Ireland and Luxembourg, while in Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, government and private sectors shared control. West Germany television operations were financed and controlled by the Länder, while the U.K. provided for separate public and private commercial operations that existed side-by-side. Some nations allowed private television, while others prohibited it. Some

allowed advertising, but others banned it. Yet in spite of these diverse approaches, strong controls exercised by national governments remained the constant throughout the European television industry. However, these policies started changing in the 1980s, corresponding with the introduction of satellite television.

CHAPTER IV
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND TELEVISION IN EUROPE

Europeans emerged from World War II willing to consider new approaches to their problems. Several cooperative organizations were formed in the hope that nations could band together. The United States encouraged this effort through the Marshall Plan which in 1947 established the European Recovery Program (ERP) providing distribution of more than \$12 billion in food, clothing, economic aid, and other resources. In 1948, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was established to distribute these funds. The OEEC provided a forum for the nations of western Europe to meet together to discuss economic issues and work together to develop solutions for their problems. In the years that followed other IGOs, such as the Council of Europe and the EC, were formed to provide other forums for cooperation among these nations.

According to Deutsch's definition, integration was the process of creating "unifying habits and institutions."¹ In post World War II Europe, through the

¹Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.

creation of such organizations, Europeans came to work together. Their labors may not always have been harmonious, but more unified habits and institutions were produced through the formation and operation of these organizations. At the time of the foundation of such organizations as the EC and the Council of Europe, television was a developing technology and was not a central issue. However, the growing impact of television in the communities of Europe and the introduction of new technologies such as satellite communications and cable television during the intervening years forced these older organizations to apply their energies to developing policies on television. These IGOs were representative of the second stage of Etzioni's model of integration, demonstrating the way that elite groups were formed to coordinate the activities in the appropriate unit sector, in this case, television. This chapter will examine major IGOs which impacted the development of television or which were concerned with television-related technologies. In addition, other IGOs were established which addressed the development of television and provided oversight to various aspects of television activities in Europe.

Council of Europe

The Council of Europe was established on May 4, 1949. It grew from an initial membership of ten nations to twenty-one by 1987. Its purpose was to achieve greater

unity among member-nations, determine ways for its members to work together to improve the economic and social life of the people in member-nations, and uphold the principles of democracy. The Council's executive functions were the responsibility of a Committee of Ministers, made up of Ministers of Foreign Affairs from each country. Other Council organizations included a Parliamentary Assembly (which met once a year), a Secretariat, a Commission of Human Rights, a Court of Human Rights, a Committee on the Mass Media, and other committees. Decisions by the Committee of Ministers and the Court of Human Rights were binding on all member-nations. Because of this authority and the gravity of the subjects it tackled, Committee and Court judgments were made with caution. The Committee also made non-binding recommendations.²

In 1984 the Council made several pronouncements regarding television. The first concerned advertising. While agreeing that advertising should comply with laws of the country transmitting the advertising, the Council recommended that consideration should be given to the laws in countries of reception as well. This concern was to be particularly evident in countries where a significant proportion of a station or network's programs were seen.³

² Europa Yearbook 1985, "Council of Europe," pp. 131-133.

³ Elaine Couprie, "Transfrontier Television by Satellite," Media Bulletin, March 1985, p. 11.

In a second announcement, the Committee of Ministers issued three principles: (1) Satellite television services had to comply with the laws in the country transmitting the service. (2) Program producers had to abide by the European Convention on Human Rights, guaranteeing that diverse opinions would be provided and that audience privacy and moral concerns would be respected. (3) The right of reply or other appropriate actions had to be guaranteed when television programs crossed borders.⁴

In December 1986, the Council held its first minister-level conference exclusively dedicated to the mass media in Europe. As a result of this conference, the Council agreed to begin work on a legally binding convention for television and other media.⁵ It also decided that quotas mandating minimum levels of European produced programs on European services would not be recommended. This action directly opposed the EC Commission which proposed quotas in order to stimulate and guarantee European television program production. The Council acknowledged the importance of production to the culture, industries, and economies of Europe, but concluded that quotas inadequately addressed this problem.⁶

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Jack Kindred, "Pan-European Satellite TV Regulations in the Works," Variety, December 17, 1986, p. 42.

⁶ Cable and Satellite Europe, January 1987, p. 5.

Early in 1987, the Council proposed a regulation prohibiting the transmission of advertising originating from one country but aimed at an audience in another country without the permission of the government of the country of reception. This reflected the attempt of the Council to resolve the issue of television conflicts.⁷

The Council's importance to the television debate was acknowledged by other European IGOs. For example, the EC's Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information, and Sport acknowledged that the EC was merely "part of the free and democratic Europe associated within the Council of Europe." In this context, EC actions were not taken in isolation but brought the Community "in line with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights." However, the committee expressed concern that the Council was not adequately addressing the problems with the situation in Europe. It also criticized the Council for its perceived aim to "preserve and protect existing national markets as far as possible" rather than create a common market throughout Europe, which the committee believed should be its goal. In contrast, the EC was committed to encourage an integrated market, not simply to break down broadcasting barriers.⁸

⁷ "Council of Europe May Challenge Scan-Sat," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1987, p. 6.

⁸ European Parliament, Document WG(2) 1738E, Brussels, 1985, pp. 31-33.

The stature and authority of the Council of Europe assured that its actions would influence the development of television in Europe. Actions it took during the 1980s to address cross-border transmission and advertising were indicative of its recognition of the need for resolution of conflicts between European nations on the subject of television.

European Broadcasting Union

The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was founded in 1950 as an umbrella organization for broadcasting organizations in Europe. Its active and associate members included more than 100 organizations. Active membership was limited to those directly involved in European broadcasting while associate membership was open to organizations elsewhere in the world. The EBU assisted in the development of all forms of broadcasting and supported member interests. Its committees studied technical, administrative, and legal problems for member organizations.⁹ Its most visible contribution to European television was its Eurovision service. Conceived in 1954, Eurovision was a television service provided to member nations which included sporting and cultural events, and news.¹⁰ Having launched this part-time service, the EBU

⁹ Anne-Michele Eckstein, ed., Television and New Technology (Brussels: European News Agency, 1986), pp. I. 1-2

¹⁰ Europa Yearbook 1985, p. 244.

had hoped to establish a television station that could serve all Europe full-time. Such a service would require the cooperation of its members and provide television programs that could be seen every day throughout Europe. It tested this concept in 1982 with a service called "Eurikon." This test was backed by many of Europe's largest broadcasting organizations. The EBU felt sufficiently satisfied with the test to develop the concept further. This project became known as "Europa" and began daily transmission in 1985. The EBU had received a commitment from the European Space Agency (ESA) for a free transponder on a satellite it was to launch in the late 1980s.¹¹ However, lack of political and economic support, inadequate distribution, and greater than expected costs led to the cancellation of Europa in 1986, before its new satellite could be launched. The EBU and other organizations hoped to revive the project with participation from more nations and with reception in more European countries.¹²

To the EBU, television as well as all broadcasting activity were part of the cultural and social life of every nation. Decisions regarding broadcasting were not to be based on financial considerations or to be viewed from any

¹¹ Simon Baker, "A Go-Ahead at Last," Cable and Satellite Europe, January 1985, pp. 20-21.

¹² "Losses," Multichannel News, p. 23

perspective that would threaten national sovereignty. An approach based on economics alone might undermine national organizations, and change the nature of broadcasting in Europe, which should not be encouraged. The EBU agreed with a German Federal Constitutional Court's opinion that broadcasting organizations performed a 'public function,' not merely an economic one. Because of this perspective, the EBU refused to approach television from the common market perspective as favored by the EC. The EBU viewed efforts by the EC and others to develop a European media policy as threats to national broadcasting laws and to the health of television in Europe. In the view of the EBU, international television policies already were recognized and in place through the World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC)--a group within the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Any actions by the EC, the EBU believed, would subvert the international broadcasting system which was already in place and functioning, and which provided all the regulations that were necessary.¹³

The EBU recommended that no further activity in developing a European television policy be undertaken within the EC. It also recommended that the new media associated with satellite communications be allowed to develop before attempts to form media policies be made. With satellite technology still in the developmental stage,

¹³ Parliament, Document WG(2) 1738E, pp. 25-26.

the EBU stressed the need to let the technology progress with as few restrictions as possible. Increased regulations at this stage might limit its evolution. From its point of view, actions by the EBU itself and the Council of Europe were sufficient to protect broadcasting organizations. Nothing should be done to undermine either these organizations or the control of television at the national level.¹⁴ EBU's president would not even comment on the 1985 EC Commission Green Paper on the Media. He believed media policy was strictly a national consideration and deferred comment to EBU member governments.

The EBU acknowledged a fragmentation within the European television community, and agreed on the urgency for unified technical standards to eliminate waste and inefficiency caused by the nations of Europe adopting their own standards and systems. In its view, the EBU had been working for years to end this fragmentation. It believed it already had much of the framework and mandate to rectify problems in European television. It urged support for its efforts and systems, which were based on nearly 40 years of involvement in European television, rather than creating new organizations or stimulating new efforts within other organizations such as the EC.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ George Waters, speech to the Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15, 1986.

The actions and policies of the EBU demonstrated the importance of television to Europe and the degree to which differences existed regarding the direction European television should take. As the voice of Europe's national broadcasting organizations, the EBU championed national sovereignty and stressed that television questions should remain within the jurisdiction of national governments and international broadcasting organizations already in existence. While striving for harmonization and close communications in programming and technical standards, the EBU championed national rights and sovereignty within a cooperative European environment.

European Space Agency

The first pan-European space organization, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), was formed in 1972 to pool Europe's resources in order more efficiently to develop an effective space program for participating nations. Within months, several nations joined to form the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), to develop Europe's rocket launcher capability. In 1975 ESRO and ELDO were merged into the European Space Agency (ESA). France was the dominant member in ESA with 63.87 percent ownership. The remaining percentage was divided among nine other nations, the largest of which was West Germany.¹⁶

¹⁶Allan Ward, "Science Reaches Orbit," Space, pp. 3-4.

ESA was the only European organization capable of launching satellites, the instrument by which satellite television was relayed throughout the continent. It provided a forum for planning, national government interaction, and staying on the cutting edge of satellite technology. ESA also cooperated with other major IGOs in Europe's utilization of space technology for television.

Intelsat

The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) was founded on August 20, 1964, to establish the world's first global satellite communications network. By 1987, Intelsat had 112 member-nations, including all the major nations of Europe. Intelsat maintained a system of orbiting satellites as well as support ground stations for signal reception and distribution.¹⁷ Intelsat took on additional importance for Europe because several satellite television services used Intelsat satellites for distribution of their programming. This usage was important in the development of satellite television in Europe. Intelsat promised to continue to be important for Europe, primarily as a distribution system.

Eutelsat

European nations agreed that Intelsat played a valuable role in international satellite development.

¹⁷ Lang, Almanac, pp. 57-59.

However, they concluded that Europe needed to develop its own satellite distribution system. Therefore, in 1977, the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT) was established. Membership included 25 nations by 1987, and was open to any country that was a member of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the organization from which Eutelsat received its most significant impetus. Responsibility for membership in Eutelsat was with each member-nation's PTT, the governmental department responsible for post, telegraph, telephone, and other related services.¹⁸

Originally, Eutelsat was created to supply telephone, high-speed data transmissions, and Eurovision transmissions from the EBU. Prior to the launch of its first satellite, Eutelsat F1, a television service, later renamed "Sky Channel," started transmitting on an Intelsat satellite. Cable systems throughout Europe started carrying its programming. Sky Channel's transmissions moved to one of the U.K.'s transponders on F1 after its launch. The impact of Sky Channel changed the nature of Eutelsat's service, and within one year of its launch F1 was used almost exclusively for program distribution from satellite television services.¹⁹ Eutelsat maintained a monopoly on telecommunications links (including television

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 117-19.

¹⁹ Ibid.

signals) relayed between countries of Europe. Eutelsat developed the technical systems for use in Europe, but member PTTs or their designated representatives decided how to use the systems provided. Eutelsat satellites were built and launched by the ESA. Once functional, satellites became Eutelsat responsibility. Because demand for satellites was great and available space initially was limited, a system had to be devised to award access to satellites fairly. Eutelsat determined that satellite use would be allocated based on the size of contributions to Eutelsat, with the larger nations getting the most desirable allocations. However, its director and governing board attempted to make these allocations as fair and equitable as possible, providing space for nations of all sizes.²⁰

Eutelsat and its director general, Andrea Caruso, were vocal about the direction being taken for European satellite systems. Eutelsat strongly opposed the Coronet and Astra projects developed by SES in Luxembourg. Caruso argued that the EC ratified the Eutelsat agreement which gave it exclusive power to operate satellites in Europe. Eutelsat opposed these projects for legal as well as practical reasons. Development of projects like Astra weakened the Eutelsat system, impairing all of its members

²⁰ Conversation with Kr. Folkestad, Norwegian Telecommunications Administration, and Hans Bratterud, New World Channel, Oslo, March 8, 1985.

by making the systems less efficient. Caruso expressed astonishment that the Luxembourg government could both belong to Eutelsat and encourage the SES projects. He found it "inconceivable that a government with a strong commitment to Europeanism, such as Luxembourg's, could support such a venture."²¹ Eutelsat believed its monopoly power was needed for Europe to develop successfully its satellite capability. Caruso warned of the disastrous consequences if there were no controls over satellite development and utilization in Europe. "If deregulation takes place in European satellite telecommunications, there will only be losers," he warned. "There is not enough demand for TV distribution and telecommunications service here to support two competitive systems." As the voice of the PTTs, Eutelsat supported the monopoly power enjoyed by all PTTs, as well as by Eutelsat itself. Caruso predicted economic and social disorder if private operators competed with government organizations.²² Eutelsat and SES resolved their differences in September 1987, when a compromise was announced by which Eutelsat agreed to end its opposition to SES.²³

²¹ Glyndwr Matthias, "The Monopoly Strikes Back," Cable and Satellite Europe, March 1987, p. 40.

²² Simon Baker, "Eutelsat Closes Rank," Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1984, pp. 10-11.

²³ "Eutelsat and Astra Coordinate," Cable and Satellite Express, October 2, 1987, p. 1.

Eutelsat promised to take an active role in shaping European developments in satellite television. It was the forum for decision-makers in Europe to determine the type of satellite systems and hence the delivery systems for television of the future.

European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)

CEPT was established in 1959 to strengthen relations between postal and telecommunications administrations in Europe. Efforts to provide a more advanced distribution system for its responsibilities encouraged CEPT to establish Eutelsat. In 1987, 26 nations were part of CEPT. Its responsibilities included harmonizing the administrative and technical aspects of the European PTTs.²⁴

Various Associations

Although not IGOs, associations have acted together to bring groups within European nations to help direct activities in the development of television. While not having the same influence and power as IGOs, many of these organizations had considerable influence because of the stature of their collective memberships. Key associations included the European Federation for Audiovisual Filmmakers, the European Cinematographic Office, European

²⁴ Eckstein, Television, p. I 1.

Bureau of Consumer Unions, and European Association of Advertising Agencies.

Summary

The involvement of these IGOs in the development and oversight of various aspects of television resulted in increased interaction among various European nations at many levels. The IGO with the most visibility in Europe was the EC. The following chapter is dedicated to its role in the evolution of television in Europe.

CHAPTER V
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
AND THE INTEGRATED TELEVISION MARKET

The EC developed out of Jean Monnet's lobbying for a sharing of resources in Europe, specifically the raw materials that had been a subject of disputes between Germany and France.¹ This cause was taken up by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and on May 9, 1950, Schuman unveiled a plan that was to bear his name. The Schuman Plan called for the pooling of the production of all coal and steel in France and Germany, as well as other countries wanting to participate.² The proposal was embraced by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as well as by the Benelux countries. On May 4, 1951, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy signed the treaty in Paris that created the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS). The dialogue among these nations continued and in 1952 they created the European Defence Community (EDC). The EDC, although later rejected by the French Parliament and never

¹ Monnet, Memoirs, p. 291-293.

² Harold Cullender, "France Proposes a Coal-Steel Pool with German Unit," New York Times, May 10, 1950, p. 1.

put into effect, would have created a combined European military force. On March 25, 1957, the six nations adopted the Treaties of Rome, which brought into existence the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the EC. These treaties went into effect on January 1, 1958. Joint administrative supervision was developed for the three treaty organizations, and their activities were generally referred to in terms of the EC. The EC sought to establish a genuine common market among the member-nations, stimulate growth and harmonization of member economic policies, and improve the standard of living for their peoples. Customs duties between members and other restrictions limiting the flow of goods across borders were to be eliminated. A system was to be established to abolish distorted practices in competition. Perhaps most importantly, the EC was given legal authority to establish a common market among signatory nations. Membership in the Community increased to nine in 1973 with the addition of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, to ten in 1981 with the addition of Greece, and to twelve in 1986 when Spain and Portugal joined.³ In 1987, Turkey applied for admission.

General direction of the EC was provided by the European Council, an organization technically not part of the Treaties of Rome. Since it included the heads of state and government for member-nations, this Council, so-named

³Europa Yearbook 1985, p. 138.

in 1975 by then French President Giscard d'Estaing, met regularly to set the course and approve major policy for the Community. By treaty the highest ranking division of the EC was the Council of Ministers, represented in most cases by each nation's foreign minister. The EC Commission was responsible for the administration of the Community. Member-nations appointed one member to the Commission, with the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. having an additional member to reflect their large populations. Once appointed, commissioners were not to consult with their governments about Community matters.⁴ The only part of the EC government directly elected by the people of Europe was the European Parliament (EP), although originally its members were selected by the national governments. Initially conceived as a consultant and watchdog body, the powers and responsibilities of the EP increased during the 1980s to include expanded budget obligations. The work of the 434-member EP was often accomplished in committees and subcommittees which studied and made recommendations on specific subjects.⁵ Legal affairs within the Community were the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, made up of thirteen judges who were appointed, at the consent of the national governments,

⁴ Ibid., p. 141.

⁵ The European Parliament (Information Service, European Parliament: Luxembourg, 1985), p. 14.

for terms of six years. Appeals could be brought to the Court by member-states, the Council, the Commission, or any person or company affected by a decision of any part of the EC. All Court decisions were binding and final, and could not be appealed in national courts.⁶

The Treaties of Rome and Paris established a community intended "to lay the foundation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." The EC was charged with working to "eliminate the barriers which divide Europe," and the national governments pledged themselves to achieve this goal through their signatures on the Treaties and through their personal and official commitments to European unity.⁷ However, television was evolving throughout Europe as an industry and a broadcasting medium along strictly national lines. Chapter Three of this thesis detailed the depth to which television policies and practices were indigenous to each nation-state. Exacting regulations in matters such as advertising content and programming philosophy had the force of limiting interaction across borders. Technical standards were typical of the nationalistic approaches in evidence. As color television was being developed, each nation

⁶ Commission of the European Communities, The Court of Justice (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1984), p. 27.

⁷ European Community Information Service, "Europe Without Frontiers by 1992," European Community News, August 2, 1985, p. 5.

determined its own standards for transmission and reception of television signals. Even though the EC, the EBU, and other IGOs were in existence throughout this period, countries in Europe did not agree upon a single standard for television. Most nations adapted the "phase alteration by line," or PAL system; but France and Greece opted for the "Séquence Couleur à Mémoire," or SECAM system.⁸ This led to two separate, parallel technical systems and divided the European market with resulting increases in production, distribution, and marketing costs. Fragmentation and inefficiencies multiplied in research and development, equipment, quality, and other aspects. The lack of unity in Europe had many repercussions. An increasing volume of television equipment sold in Europe came from Japan and the U.S. Many television programs were produced in the U.S. Europe's lack of harmony and unity produced the very fragmentation of efforts and counterproductivity the EC's founders had sought to avoid.⁹

During the 1980s, the EC began exerting pressure to move the Community closer to a common market. In early 1985 then Commission President Jacques Delors told the EP that Europe had fallen behind "in a world where large entities dominate." Europe had manpower and capital resources comparable to those of the U.S. and Japan. "What

⁸Lang, World Satellite Almanac, p. 17.

⁹Eckstein, Television, pp. 3, 53.

we lack," he summarized, "is a genuine common market where all economic and scientific operators can engage more easily in exchanges and cooperation." Later that year, the Commission reported to the European Council that Europe was at a "crossroads." The report concluded that "we either go ahead--with resolution and determination--or we drop back into mediocrity."¹⁰

Faced with these choices, Community leaders agreed upon a goal: the creation of a truly common market without frontiers by 1992. By that year barriers were to be removed, and the sale and marketing, as well as the flow of products and services, were to be possible as easily across as within national boundaries. In February 1986 final Community approval was given to what was called the "Single European Act," which made this goal the official policy of the EC and its individual member-nations. Every effort was to be made to make Europe into a unified market by 1992. The Commission approached every aspect of Europe within EC jurisdiction to determine how barriers to the common market could be eliminated.¹¹ Television was one of the industries on which the Commission focused attention. The Commission believed that television was critical to the development of a unified market, and that it was the duty

¹⁰ Information Service, "Europe Without Frontiers," pp. 1-2.

¹¹ "The Institutions of the European Community," Europe, May 1987, p. 23.

and the responsibility of the EC both to have and enforce a Community television policy.¹²

The following sections summarize the actions taken by and the perspectives of each branch of the EC pertaining to television. This will demonstrate the position each developed within the 1980s, and the consensus throughout the Community on television policy in Europe.

The European Court of Justice

It was said that the foundation for Community action rested in its legal framework within the Treaties of Rome and Paris. The Community was established as a legal entity with an existence based on law. At the first gathering of the ECSC Assembly, Jean Monnet remarked that, "The union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone. Rules are needed." He said that the only way to prevent war was to create institutions and legal systems to sustain the Community, and that the Community needed to exist with "the sanction of law, under the authority of the Court."¹³ The importance of law to the Community was also echoed by another of its early leaders, Walter Hallstein, one time state secretary in the foreign ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. Hallstein wrote that the EC "is a creation of law; it is a source of law; and it is a legal

¹² Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 8-9.

¹³ Monnet, Memoirs, p. 384.

system." He concluded that Community member-states "surrender a part of their separate national sovereignty, and . . . create an entirely new and independent legal system to which both they as states and their citizens are subject."¹⁴

The European Court of Justice was established to interpret and confirm Community actions in light of the legal parameters of primary and secondary legislation. Primary legislation applied to agreements made by the member-states themselves which had the force of creating binding laws. This consisted of Community treaties and agreements among the member-states with relevance to Community life. Secondary legislation included law created by Community institutions and international agreements concluded by the Community as a whole.¹⁵ The Court acted to interpret primary and secondary legislation and provide clear definitions of the nature and laws of the Community. An example was the landmark 1962 van Gend en Loos case. In this case the Court concluded that the Community was a "new legal order of international law for the benefits of which the States have limited their sovereign rights." The sovereignty of the Community applied both to member-states

¹⁴Walter Hallstein, Europe in the Making, trans. Charles Roetter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 30, 33.

¹⁵Commission of the European Communities, The European Community's Legal System, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1984), p. 5.

as well as to the peoples within those states. Therefore Community laws created rights and obligations for Community institutions, member-states, and citizens of every member-state.¹⁶ In the 1964 Costa versus ENEL case, the Court ruled that The EC Treaty "created its own legal system which . . . became an integral part of the legal system of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply." Through this decision, an official relationship was established between national courts and the Court of Justice, with the Court acting as the final court of appeals for all actions of national courts. That same year, the Court ruled that "the executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic law, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty." Here the Court established its primacy over domestic laws within member-states in any matter relative to the Community. Another type of case heard by the Court was proceedings for annulment. These proceedings were attempts to overturn action taken by a Community organization. They could be brought to the Court by member-states, other Community organizations, or by individuals.¹⁷

The Court heard several cases that allowed it to apply these principles to television in the Community. In

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁷ Commission, Court, p. 13.

1984, Gijs de Vries, an EP member (MP) from the Netherlands, argued before the Court that Dutch media laws violated the Treaty of Rome which allowed for a free flow of information among EC member-nations. He attacked Dutch culture minister Eelco Brinkman for "perpetuating provincial politics which are not in agreement with the spirit of the European Community." In describing what he expected from the Court, de Vries said, "There will be very little left of the Dutch media policy when the European judge has finished with it."¹⁸ The Court agreed with de Vries and ordered the Dutch government to bring its media policies in line with the Treaty.¹⁹ De Vries vowed to bring every member-state before the Court if he believed it violated the Treaties.²⁰ In 1985, de Vries teamed with French MP Simone Veil to challenge French media laws in the Court of Justice. De Vries and Veil claimed French law violated the Treaty of Rome by restricting foreign station allocations on cable television systems.²¹ By 1987 no decision on this case had been made.

The Court attempted to maintain a balanced approach toward sensitive issues such as broadcasting. It sought to

¹⁸ "Dutch Government may be Forced to Change Media Law," Cable and Satellite Europe, March 1985, p. 61.

¹⁹ Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 23.

²⁰ Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 23.

²¹ "EEC Attacks French Media Law," Cable and Satellite Europe, September 1985, p. 6.

protect national interests and at the same time bring media laws and conditions in member states into line with the Treaties. Two of the governing principles of the Court were consistency and harmonization. For example, the 1978 Debaue case involved the Belgian law which acknowledged the existence of zones of natural reception of foreign broadcasting stations in Belgium. In this case the Court ruled that laws "cannot be regarded as a restriction upon freedom to provide services so long as those laws treat all such services identically whatever their origin." However, the Court also confirmed that member-states can "grant television organizations the exclusive right to conduct radio and television transmissions." It hereby confirmed national rights to television monopolies.²²

Advertising on television was another volatile issue taken before the Court of Justice. The Court affirmed each nation's right to limit and define as it saw fit the role of advertising in order to protect the general interest of the Community.²³

The extent to which member-states obeyed court ruling with which they disagreed was a fundamental factor in the future of the Community. A Community document noted that the member states generally "conform, sooner or later,

²² Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 150, 160.

²³ Ibid., pp. 150-1.

to the Court's judgment." However, there had been occasions when countries delayed compliance while attempting to change Community rules. The document warned that, "If such behavior became the norm, it would threaten the very foundation of the Community." This same document stated that no penalties were available to force member-states to comply.²⁴

While retaining its concern for the protection of national societies, the European Court of Justice actions in the case of the Dutch media laws set a precedent by ruling that national television policies must conform to Community law.²⁵ The Court's actions brought focus to the question of sovereignty in the Community, the degree to which the Community had sovereignty over television policy or any other issue, and the degree to which national governments retained it. The Court of Justice performed a significant function in interpreting Community law and providing a forum for legal decisions for the television debate. However, the Community depended on individual states to comply with Court judgments.

Television and the European Parliament

Since the EP was comprised of 434 members from nations throughout Europe, it provided a forum for the

²⁴ Commission, Court, p. 12.

²⁵ Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 23.

discussion and study of many issues of concern to individual MPs. Throughout the early 1980s, several MPs began stressing the importance of television to the Community and the need for changes in the manner in which industry was developing in Europe. Among the first activist MPs who favored stronger community action regarding television were Gijs de Vries and Wilhelm Hahn.

Dutch MP de Vries lobbied through the press, Parliament meetings, committees, before the Court of Justice, and in other forums, that a unified television policy was critical to the creation of an integrated Europe. He believed that the on-going fragmentation of the European market perpetuated an atmosphere that was harmful to all Europeans. European companies needed cross-border advertising and marketing to flourish and were hindered by the absence of an integrated community. A united European television market would stimulate its economy and benefit every sector in Europe.²⁶ De Vries claimed that too often Europeans were reactive and were unwilling to work together, and that the EC was mired in bureaucracy and slow to act. He criticized the EC Commission for being too timid in pursuing an integrated market. In 1986 he observed that the Commission had been working on a copyright policy for five years without completing a final draft. De Vries championed eliminating all but a minimum

²⁶ "Dutch Government," Cable and Satellite, p. 61.

of restrictions on television. Some people and organizations, including the EC Commission, favored quotas of minimum levels of European-produced programs for all television services in Europe. However, de Vries felt this violated common sense as well as national and Community commitments within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).²⁷ He also persistently sought changes in the media laws for the Netherlands.²⁸

West German MP Wilhelm Hahn introduced the first motion before the EP recommending that a media policy be developed for Europe.²⁹ Hahn believed that the media was the "great gate in European union," and that the common market could "only be attained if we have a common media market." In his view, television in Europe had to "go through primordial changes and become European television," no longer being national in nature. The Treaty of Rome gave the EC not just an opportunity but a mandate to harmonize the broadcasting activities in the Community. To Hahn, this harmonization was not optional.³⁰ In a December

²⁷ Gijs de Vries, speeches delivered at the Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15-16, 1986.

²⁸ Commission of the European Communities, Spokesman's Service, Document QXW0653/85EN.

²⁹ European Parliament, Debates of the European Parliament, Document No. 2-329/254, September 12, 1985.

³⁰ Wilhelm Hahn, speech delivered at the Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 16, 1986.

1985 speech in the EP, Hahn remarked that "the introduction of a European media policy will be an important step towards European union." The development of satellite television provided the Community with a great opportunity to move toward this union. In light of satellite television, he believed the Community had two choices: "let the developments unleashed by the new media pass it by or harness them in a common media policy." Satellites would mean the "end to the era of nationally and territorially limited television zones as they evolved in Europe" in the 1950s. Television was critical to establishing a common market because it would be "dismantling the frontiers and obstacles which have existed between the Member-States." Hahn claimed that media policy was the "main prerequisite for imbuing the people of Europe with the idea of European union."³¹ Urging by Hahn led the EP to support the creation of a European-wide common market for radio and television.³² Hahn was one of the MPs who believed that if Europeans did not take action to regulate the development of satellite television, market forces would exert too strong an influence on Europe. Hahn warned of American cultural imperialism since U.S. firms dominated the international television and film production industries.

³¹ European Parliament, Debates, September 12, 1985.

³² Jack Monnet, "Euro Parliament Votes to Adopt Common Market Approach to TV," Variety, October 23, 1985, p. 34.

Europe needed to unite or face domination from America.³³

Television and Parliamentary Committees

The EP was divided into eighteen permanent standing committees that enabled members to study more thoroughly proposed laws and vital issues facing the Community. Committees made reports and recommendations for consideration by the EP as a whole.³⁴ Because of its growing importance for Community life, television policy was studied by a number of these committees. The following summarizes studies on the impact of television in Europe by six of these committees.

Committee on the Environment,

Public Health and Consumer Protection

This committee noted that television was an "area of major importance as a result of its considerable and ever increasing influence on the process of European unification." It strongly supported the development of a television policy within the EC (rather than the Council of Europe). However, it concluded that laws concerning television should be enacted at the national level rather than within the EC "so as to ensure flexibility and speed of reaction to any complaints." It called for clear

³³ Hahn, Brussels speech.

³⁴ The European Parliament (Information Service, European Parliament: Luxembourg, p. 1985), p. 14.

standards of programming and advertising content to protect citizens.³⁵

Committee on Youth, Culture,
Education, Information and Sport

With Wilhelm Hahn as a committee member, the committee called on the Commission and the European Council to move toward a comprehensive European media policy. This policy was believed to be vital because a European television environment was an "essential feature of a European community in the process of integration." There had to be freedom within the Community to receive television programming from all member states. It recommended the creation of a multilingual European television service (like Europa), and the harmonization of broadcasting laws throughout Europe.³⁶

The committee recognized the importance of television to the process of European integration. All restrictions on transborder transmissions had to be eliminated if the member-states were to develop closer ties. It called on member-states "to give priority to the trans-frontier broadcasting of European and national television channels during the development of cable and satellite television to come, in order to prevent the

³⁵ Parliament, Document WG (2)1738E, p. 8-9.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

process of European integration from being hampered or jeopardized." The development of a united European television market was vital for the protection and development of European culture. It concluded that "Europe's arts industries require a single domestic market for broadcasting in order to maintain both their cultural and commercial hold internationally."³⁷

Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights

This committee concluded that telecommunications was "the most crucial of the challenges" the Community faced. Planning had to be started to set up the necessary telecommunications infrastructures. Freedom of program movement across borders was needed. Legislation within EC member-states had to be coordinated to increase harmonization of television activities and to allow Europe to compete effectively in the manufacturing and production of equipment and programs in worldwide television industries. The committee concluded that "the freedom of radio and television broadcasting is of vital importance for the very future of Europe, not only as a cultural but also as an economic entity." However, efforts to encourage economic development must not infringe upon the freedoms of Europe's citizens in any way.³⁸

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 45-49.

Committee on Energy, Research and Technology

This committee drew attention to the economic and cultural factors necessary for the development of the common market in broadcasting. For example, the fragmentation of the market forced Philips, the Dutch industrial firm, to produce more than 100 different types of television sets to meet Europe's varied technical standards. The committee believed that only by pooling its resources and by developing a common market would Europe have a market sufficiently large enough to be able to make the financial commitments necessary to produce quality programs. Without a more integrated market, this committee projected that expanded satellite television programming would mean increased dependence on American programs, thus eroding the European cultural and economic identity. The committee recommended that the Community take action to create economic incentives, remove barriers, and create a common market, but assure that individual privacy and European interests were protected. It warned that inaction by the Community would lead to increased fragmentation as well as an erosion of European industries and culture. It hoped that the Community had learned from its earlier years when no European policies were in place. The EC had to act aggressively to shape events rather than allowing events in

the broadcasting industry to develop on their own.³⁹

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
and Industrial Policy

With Gijs de Vries as an active member, this committee predictably championed the end of national technical standards for television in favor of European standards, as well as aggressive development of European initiatives and policies to assure a voice for Europe in the future of the international television industry. There was a fear that Europe already had waited too long to combine its resources and energies. For example, the Japanese had already made a united effort to establish standards for the development of high definition television (HDTV)--a higher quality television technology with better quality visual images and sound. European fragmentation may have allowed Japan to set the pace and forced Europe to play a subservient role in this industry's future.⁴⁰ The committee blamed much of these problems on the inactivity of the EC Commission, which had not been forceful enough in promoting the importance of a strong, unified Community television policy. Europe needed to band together in every way possible to avoid getting further behind.⁴¹

³⁹ The European Parliament, Document PE 98.359, pp. 17, 18, 20, 35.

⁴⁰ European Parliament, Document PE 105.541, pp. 5-10.

⁴¹ de Vries, Brussels speech.

Economic and Social Committee

Technically, this organization was not a parliamentary committee but rather a group of 156 representatives of various unions, multinational corporations, and other special interests groups in the Community. It was used often for consultation by the Commission as well as the European Council, but it had the prerogative to develop and express opinions on its own initiative as well.⁴² In 1975 this committee decided to deliver an opinion on the importance of telecommunications in the Community "as a catalyst and instigator of economic and social change." The committee noted that the Community had only begun to recognize the importance of this industry and warned that EC television standards and policies needed to be harmonized.⁴³ Ten years later, in July 1985, the committee reported that "the creation of a common market for radio and television would be of great importance" for the European economy. It recognized that "cross-frontier television broadcasting acts as an additional spur to the creation of efficient integrated communications networks which are of vital importance for the international competitiveness of European industry in the future." Many thousands of people worked in television-related activities

⁴²The European Parliament, p. 8.

⁴³The European Parliament, Official Journal of the European Communities, December 15, 1975, pp. 23, 24, 27.

and industries. This committee stressed the economic implications for stimulation of television activities, including government support for programming ventures in order to achieve better European products. Such efforts would stimulate more program production and result in less need for government support.⁴⁴

Satellite television represented a new age for the consumer with increases in programs, services, and options. The committee warned that satellite technology could help make the European public a "plaything of those who exercise a direct influence on the media." Therefore some measures were necessary to protect the public from exploitation. New elites might develop who could create a new kind of discrimination by excluding access to the media from anyone they wished to exclude. Adequate controls over programming and advertising content had to be maintained to prevent favoritism and assure that "broadcasting media do not have a harmful effect on citizens in general and on certain groups of society in particular." New television policies had to be based on the overall good of the Community rather than on financial gain or commercialism.⁴⁵

The committee conceded that satellite television programs had the potential for significant cultural change

⁴⁴ Economic and Social Committee, Revised Draft Report on Television Without Frontiers (European Economic Community: Brussels, 1985), pp. 8-9.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 15-16.

and impact. It cited studies which had demonstrated that children watched more foreign-language programs from other countries than adults, indicating that the introduction of satellite television would produce meaningful modifications in the lifestyles of future generations. Countries like Belgium and Ireland had already experienced significant cultural impact from programs received from other countries. The committee cautioned that these concerns should not be taken lightly and that the Community must take steps to make sure that national cultures are not destroyed or negatively impacted because of satellite television. It also warned of the negative consequences if Europe followed the patterns established in the United States, opened up the television market, and adopted less restrictive programming and quality standards. Europe had to avoid any development that focused on the profit motive "by pandering to the wishes of the masses and producing and sending out nothing but light-entertainment programmes." This kind of programming might attract large audiences, increase revenues, and even stimulate European integration. However, television would lose "its importance as a vehicle for the dissemination of objective information accessible to everyone, as an instrument of continuing education, and as a link between all currents of society." In this sense, television needed to be approached from a "cultural and social point of view."⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 17, 18, 23, 24.

Summary of Parliamentary Actions

Numerous parliamentary committees, MPs, and Parliament as a whole concluded that Europe had to develop a Community-wide television policy. Some policy recommendations differed among these parts of the EC, but there was general consensus that Europe would never achieve total integration as long as national governments retained control over the media. Much of Parliament's focus was on the EC Commission and its initiatives in the Community. Actions taken by the Commission are explored in the following section.

The EC Commission and Television

The EC Commission, consisting of 17 members as of 1987, was responsible to ensure that Community rules and guidelines were observed and respected. It proposed actions and policies to the Council of Ministers, implemented EC policies, and managed most of the Community budget. The Commission approached subjects such as television from many perspectives. It had to protect the human rights of Community citizens as well as uphold the Treaties and develop a common market. It was concerned with the impact decisions and policies had on relations with non-Community nations and on competition and internal relations in the Community. Only after years of study did the Commission submit its recommendations on television in Europe. Issued in June 1984, the report was called,

"Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable." This Green Paper became a focus of the television debate in Europe. The paper was written in response to Parliament's resolution on radio and television broadcasting in the EC of March 12, 1982, in which the EP recommended that rules be drawn up for European radio and television broadcasting. It acknowledged the importance of other recommendations and studies within the Community as critical in stimulating its investigation. It particularly cited a 1982 report by the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information, and Sport. This report concluded that the mass media was "controlled at the national level" and that the EC had to act at the Community level to increase European identity through a new Community media policy. The Commission recognized the fear expressed by the EC's Political Affairs Committee that chaos might result if the Community took either no action or too restrictive an approach. Article 10 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guaranteed freedom of expression in Europe, including freedom "to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." The Political Affairs Committee cautioned that "this open information market must not mean that satellite broadcasts should be

allowed to flood the Community." At the same time it must not create such freedom from controls that access to the media would be decided based on financial resources. The Commission was urged to "draw up a directive ensuring that commercial interests are channeled into a direction acceptable to the Community and made subject to certain conditions."¹⁷

The Commission set forth a broad judgment at the outset of the paper: the EC had sovereignty over television in the Community. It cited several articles within the Treaties as its justification for this assertion. Article 60 gave the EC authority over broadcast signals transmitted or relayed by radio waves within the Community. Article 59 provided for the abolition of restrictions on the freedom to broadcast within the Community. Article 62 guaranteed "broadcasters the right to transmit or relay their signal to other Member States." Articles 9, 12, 30, and 31 guaranteed "broadcaster organizations, as well as their suppliers and customers both at home and abroad, the freedom to take part in community-wide trade." Therefore the Treaties gave the Community jurisdiction over television policies and over other broadcasting activities in member-states.¹⁸

¹⁷ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 2-3. "Institutions," Europe, pp. 23-24.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

However, the Commission acknowledged that other issues relating to television needed to be considered. Technical, practical, cultural, economic, and social barriers had to be overcome to achieve a unified European television policy. The power of each nation to maintain some measure of control was never questioned; but standardization of technical, legal, and regulatory issues, and increased harmonization of policies, program standards, and production throughout Europe was necessary.⁴⁹

Once the Green Paper was issued, the Commission became more active in making other recommendations on European television. In April 1985, it recommended that the Community establish a system for aiding television program and film production in Europe. It was feared that without this stimulus, the European production industry would not be able to compete with the American production industry. The Commission proposed that the process of seeking aid be channeled to stimulate joint ventures between private and public companies in member-states. Aid would be available only to cooperative productions involving partners from at least three different member-states. It was hoped this process would stimulate integration.⁵⁰ This proposal focused attention on the

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 1-9.

⁵⁰ Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation, Document 85/C 125/09, April 23, 1985, p. 3.

Commission's belief that only a European approach to television made sense. It believed that eventually Europe would be so unified that it would have the economic and legal integration to sustain production at the scale necessary to fill market demand. All actions concerning television "must be conceived in international terms since the use of satellites will make frontiers meaningless."⁵¹

Another expression of its concern for television was the "M.E.D.I.A." program (for "Mesures pour Encourager le Developpement de l'Industrie de production Audiovisuelle," or measure for the development of the audiovisual production industry). This policy recommended three measures: (1) broadcast standard uniformity; (2) audiovisual market flexibility based on recommendations in the Green Paper; and (3) support and stimulation for production development. This policy urged that all Community branches and member-states work together to increase the unification and prosperity of the people of Europe as well as their united influence throughout the world. M.E.D.I.A. encouraged the simultaneous production of programs in many languages in order "to overcome the language barrier which stands in the way of trading cultural products." It also supported development of less expensive subtitling and dubbing procedures, cooperative

⁵¹ Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation, Document COM (85) 174 final, June 10, 1985, p. 1.

projects like Europa, and financial backing of multilingual projects.⁵² In March 1986, the Commission recommended that the Community and all member-states adopt a new technical standard for television transmission, the "MAC family standards." This policy was recommended after years of study involving the EBU, leading industrial organizations, and national governments. It set the course for increased technical harmonization within the Community.⁵³

While the Commission as a whole believed television was important for integration, individual commissioners expressed their own personal concern for television's role in Europe. Lord Cockfield actively championed the unification of television policy within the EC and believed television would play a decisive role in determining the future nature of European integration. In September 1985, he said that television "can exercise a powerful influence in bringing together the peoples of Europe into a single integrated Community." He warned that it was impossible to "stop the dissemination of television across the frontiers." He feared that "member states, often acting under pressure from interested lobbies, will try and introduce regulatory systems which are at variance with one another" resulting in further fragmentation rather than

⁵² Commission of the European Communities, The M.E.D.I.A. Programme, pp. 1-4.

⁵³ Eckstein, Television, p. 61.

increased unification. This would undermine the Community and the good of Europe. He believed, however, that television could not be approached in isolation but needed to be viewed as an integral part of Europe's economic and cultural objectives. Rights of citizens and national interests also could not be overlooked.⁵⁴

Commissioner for Information Technology Karl-Heinz Narjes said that "without a standardization policy, Europe will inevitably be condemned to Babelization."⁵⁵ He believed that the Commission needed to work out policies and actions in close collaboration with industry. It made no sense to develop standards that would cripple industrial firms. Therefore all sectors within the Community had to cooperate in developing television policies.⁵⁶

Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana sought backing for the Europa project and was among the most vocal in expressing outrage and disappointment at its termination. De Meana urged that European television policies be developed with minimal regulations, primarily concentrating on the creation of uniform technical standards, stimulating multilingual broadcasting, and overcoming legal obstacles

⁵⁴ Statement by Lord Cockfield in reply to the "Debate on Television Without Frontiers," Strasbourg, September 12, 1985, pp. 1-4.

⁵⁵ "E.C. Pushes Standards for Telecommunications," Europe, July/August 1985, p. 47.

⁵⁶ "E.C. Proposal Would Limit TV Advertising," Europe, June 1986, p. 39.

within the Community. He was enthusiastic about the capability of Europe to transmit programs simultaneously in many languages. He believed that through this kind of multilingual service "for the first time since the Roman Empire" it would be possible for Europe to exist without language barriers. The absence of these barriers would mean a more unified Europe. Di Meana pointed to one event in particular as decisive in his assessment of the importance of the development of a European approach to television. When the U.S. bombed Libya in 1986, he learned of the bombing while watching the Cable News Network (CNN) in a European hotel room. This privately-owned U.S. news service provided, he believed, "only the American point-of-view and interest" in this international dispute. This displayed America's potential dominance of satellite television programming. Europe must not allow American biases and cultural perspectives to shape news reporting and attitudes of European people. He favored further integration of Europe and economic stimulation of the European programming community in order to develop more European programming and believed that Europe must become less dependent on American programming.⁵⁷

Council of Ministers and European Council

The Council of Ministers and the European Council

⁵⁷Di Meana, Brussels speech.

were the only branches of the Community which directly represented the member-states of the Community. They had to balance desires for EC growth and the strengthening of the European cause in the world with concerns for the people, companies, and ways of life within their individual nations. By custom since 1966, all Council of Minister decisions were unanimous. This process often required lengthy debates, reviews, and compromises to reach agreements.⁵⁸ A completed Commission policy recommendation had to be submitted to the EP for its consideration and approval. Once approved by the EP, the policy was referred to member-state governments for review. No specific time limits were set for this period; in some cases reviews took as long as fifteen years. Their final conclusions and recommendations would come through the Council of Ministers and/or the European Council. With Council of Ministers approval, member-nations would be given a set time to bring their own media policies in line with Community policies.⁵⁹

Summary

Throughout the European Economic Community there was strong belief that television was a decisive factor for the creation of an integrated Europe. The Parliament,

⁵⁸ Stuart de la Mahotière, Towards One Europe (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 297-9.

⁵⁹ Cable and Satellite Europe, May 1986, p. 47.

Commission, and even the Council spoke clearly and often about the need for European standards and strategies. The Court of Justice told the nations they had to comply with the Treaties they had signed and not hinder the reception or distribution of broadcasting signals throughout the Community. Yet there remained significant national policies and laws which violated the spirit and even the letter of the Treaties of Rome and Paris.

CHAPTER VI
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET

In April 1982, facing uncertain financial return and significant political and regulatory obstacles, an English-language television service called "Sky Channel" began broadcasting via satellite from the U.K. Rather than wait for all the legal and political issues involving commercial television throughout Europe to be resolved, Sky Channel decided to move ahead with its distribution and marketing. Growth at first was slow, but more and more cable television systems throughout Europe began asking for and receiving their government's approval to carry Sky Channel. The public began to be aware of this new service and demand for it increased. While national governments, the EC, and other IGOs wrestled with weighty political issues such as sovereignty, legal parameters, and programming philosophy, Sky Channel created a genuine European television service.¹

¹Information regarding Sky Channel and other television satellite services was based in part on meetings with the following advertising agency executives: Ian Speer, Ted Bates Advertising, London, June 26, 1985; Phil Reber, Doyle Dane Bernbach Advertising, London, June 28, 1985; Simon Lloyd, Foote, Cone, and Belding Advertising,

Sky Channel's impact was significant in part because of the kind of programming it offered. Many statesmen and visionaries dreamed of a television service showcasing exclusively European-produced programs that would reflect the finest representation of its distinctive culture. However, Sky Channel's schedule was comprised mainly of movies, older situation comedies, action-adventure series, and professional wrestling. Almost all of its programming initially was of American origin.² To the concern of many leaders in Europe, English-language programs were beamed across the continent, all to positive and even enthusiastic reception by the public. People all over Europe demonstrated a hunger for the kind of diverse programming this new commercial service provided. Overnight, Sky Channel became a sensation.³ By 1987, more than ten million households across Europe were receiving English-language programming from Sky Channel. Less than three percent of these households were in the U.K., demonstrating how European Sky Channel's delivery had become.⁴ Its success compounded fears that American cultural influences, which were perceived already as being

London, June 26, 1985; and Leo Stumpel, Foote, Cone, and Belding Advertising, Amsterdam. September 28, 1984.

² Sky Channel sales brochure.

³ Brenda Maddox, "Sky King," pp. 53-55.

⁴ "In Vision," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1987, pp. 54-55.

too strong, might become even stronger. Rather than a cultural resurgence for Europe, pan-European television seemed to be spawning what came to be called "American cultural imperialism."⁵

The governments of Europe reacted to the marketing inroads and appeal of Sky Channel in many ways. Each national government retained the right to license reception of all satellite programming services into the country through its PTT. The exercise of this power violated Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibited signatory nations from blocking reception of any broadcasting service sent from another signatory nation. Since Sky Channel transmitted from the U.K. and was seen at least in some parts of the U.K., it was illegal under Community law to block its reception for any reason. Yet this was done. Since Sky Channel was available only through satellite distribution, it had to negotiate with each national PTT to be cleared for reception. This process took years of negotiations. Through its persistence, Sky Channel overcame distribution obstacles, and by 1987 it was received in some form in every major country in western Europe.⁶

Once Sky Channel proved there was a market for

⁵Di Meana speech.

⁶"In Vision," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1987, pp. 54-55.

satellite television in Europe, other services were developed. These included services dedicated to French-language variety programs (TV-5), religious programs (New World Channel), English-language movies (Premiere and TEN), children's shows (The Children's Channel), sports (Screen Sport), women's programming (Lifestyle), and several American networks, including Cable News Network and MTV Europe.⁷ In early 1987, the ITV companies of the U.K. introduced a service called SuperChannel, to compete directly with Sky Channel for the English-language general entertainment audience.⁸ The proliferation of satellite networks in the late 1980s prompted one television executive to describe the situation as "technology gone mad."⁹

Interest in Sky Channel and other satellite television networks was stimulated by the desire and need of multinational corporations for media to deliver advertising messages to Europe. Advertising on radio and television had been unavailable or restricted in all European markets.¹⁰ Restrictions and policies existed in

⁷ "Datafile," Cable and Satellite Europe, July 1987, p. 64.

⁸ Laurel Wentz, "Pan-European TV Rivals Need Larger Ad Market," Advertising Age, February 16, 1987.

⁹ "Crowded Skies Over Europe," Sales and Marketing Management, June 1987, p. 35.

¹⁰ Madlyn Resener, "The Coming Boom in European Advertising," Adweek, September ;8, 1986, p. F.P. 4.

each nation making it difficult or impossible to develop advertising and marketing that could be applied throughout Europe.¹¹ In the Netherlands, for example, advertising time had to be requested months and in some cases more than a year in advance of the airing of the commercial to meet government guidelines.¹² European businesses hoped for years that television controls would be loosened, new television services would be introduced, and that it would be possible to have the same kind of access and availability advertisers enjoyed in the U.S.¹³

Sky Channel inaugurated a new kind of delivery system which allowed an advertiser to transmit one advertising message and have it received simultaneously throughout Europe. Its sales literature proclaimed that satellite television offered advertisers in Europe "an entirely new opportunity--a European audience." Sky Channel encouraged the development of an integrated market by appealing to multinational companies and manufacturers which could use satellite television "to boost and enhance their brand image, harmonizing product awareness across Europe." Sky Channel claimed to be "the first TV station dedicated to home entertainment across Europe." The

¹¹ Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 259-293.

¹² Stumpel interview.

¹³ Speer interview.

emphasis was not on European origins but on entertainment for Europe.¹⁴

The marketplace responded enthusiastically to the concept of satellite television. Its introduction in many nations coincided with the introduction of private television and/or loosening of standards for commercial utilization of television. Authorities from many professions throughout Europe and America observed the impact that the introduction of these new media had on Europe. A Lisbon advertising executive said, "Private television will serve as a catalyst in the market and will open up the possibility of more new [product] launches."¹⁵ An American marketing executive said he was expecting Europe "to be a lot more flexible in TV and the marketplace. Anything that would deregulate the government shackles on those countries is good for business and product development."¹⁶ A French advertising manager said, "We used to talk about pan-European marketing and advertising only as a theory." He concluded that national boundaries were disappearing in Europe and that advertisers had started to treat Europe as one market.¹⁷ The giant American packaged goods company,

¹⁴ Sky Channel Sales Brochure.

¹⁵ Julie Skur Hill, "Marketers Eye European TV," Advertising Age, December 1, 1986, p. 68.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Madlyn Resener, "Europe's New Mass Market Appeal," Adweek, June 1, 1987, p. G.A. 6.

Procter and Gamble, began manufacturing products for European distribution with unified package designs.¹⁸ A London executive said, "To segment markets by nationality is naive" since Europe's leading businesses looked for "cross-cultural marketing" which could apply to all countries in Europe.¹⁹ A major international advertising agency, DDB Needham Worldwide, developed the word "Euromarketing" to describe its concept of market trends in Europe. It concluded that there were few significant differences in consumer behavior among European peoples throughout the continent. They found there were more things binding Europeans together than dividing them, and that the trend toward greater commonality and integration was accelerating.²⁰ In May 1987, the president of the European Association of Advertising Agencies, Armand de Malherbe, predicted that satellite television would transform Europe into one market. He concluded that "the Europe we have known is about to disappear into the mist of history," and that "the 3,200 miles of frontiers that divided Europe will be erased." He said television was the primary cause of this development.²¹ A 1986 study by two

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. G.A. 6-7.

²⁰ Ibid., p. G.A. 14.

²¹ Stewart Alter, "TV Melts Europe's Borders," Advertising Age, May 18, 1987.

Kent State University professors concluded that three trends dominated European marketing in the 1980s. First, marketers were less concerned about targeting their efforts at individual national markets. Instead they were attempting to reach Europeans as consumers regardless of the particular nation in which they lived. Second, more companies were developing a single product with one image for all of Europe. Products in many categories received common packaging and promotion efforts. In the past companies had treated each nation as a separate market. Third, there was a "rapid increase in the use of satellite television for commercial purposes." Satellite television was proving a tool to stimulate unification in Europe. The European consumer had begun to develop a new identity based increasingly on images originating from outside the nation. This led to an expanded sense of Europe as the focus for the future European market.²²

However, the impact of satellite television did not mean that Europe existed as a single, unified political entity. More often than not, growth of satellite television came in spite of political obstacles. Sky Channel's Managing Director, Patrick Cox, explained that the Channel had to overcome enormous legal obstacles necessitated by the political conditions in Europe. Even

²² John Ryans, Jr., and Donald Howard, "A Continental Market," American Demographics Magazine, July 1987, p. 54.

if marketing and advertising professionals had begun treating Europe as one market, each country remained separate. Negotiations took place over substantial periods of time with each governmental organization and with individual cable systems. Sky Channel's experience proved to Cox that the EC needed to lay down and enforce new ground rules and sweep away the massive confusion that existed in European television in order for satellite television services to be able to exist.²³ Cox's appraisal was in contrast to the optimistic press attention Sky Channel often received. Sky Channel's successes came at tremendous cost; it had never been profitable. In fact, in September 1987, rumors surfaced that Sky Channel was for sale or that new partners were being sought to help defray operational costs.²⁴

Sky Channel also introduced another element to the European satellite television debate: the role of the independently wealthy entrepreneur. In 1982 Sky Channel was purchased by Australian newspaper magnate Rupert Murdoch.²⁵ The introduction of a person with the wealth and independence of Murdoch in an industry previously

²³ Patrick Cox, speech delivered at the Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15, 1986.

²⁴ "Murdoch Denies Sky Sale Rumor," Variety, September 16, 1987, p. 52.

²⁵ Sky Channel Sales Brochure.

controlled almost entirely by governments caused concern in Europe. Many people wondered if his involvement in satellite television was too commercial for the good of Europe.²⁶ However, Murdoch proved to be merely the first of the entrepreneurs to enter the satellite television business. He was joined by Robert Maxwell, Murdoch's rival in the English publishing industry, and by the Italian Silvio Berlusconi, the Frenchmen Jerome Seydoux, the German Leo Kirch, and others.

Berlusconi allied himself with the Socialist Party in Italy and sought to use this alliance to increase his influence in Italy and throughout Europe. He became full or part owner of television stations in France, Spain, as well as Italy.²⁷ Proving the degree to which he was thinking on a European scale, Berlusconi announced plans to develop a television service that would help unit the European market. "Imagine a single program linking all of Europe from a single broadcaster," he said. "Europe has been looking for its unity for years, for a United States of Europe. Only television can create such a reality." This ambition made him admired as well as feared.²⁸

²⁶ Many speakers, Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15-16, 1986.

²⁷ "Toward the Unification of Europe," Videoage, April 1986, p. 104.

²⁸ Jack Loftus, "Italo Kingpin Eyes Pan-Euro TV," Variety, October 23, 1985, p. 1.

In early 1987, Robert Maxwell, who had already been involved with several European satellite television services including the Premiere movie service, created an organization called the European Television Broadcasting Corporation. This corporation was designed to become a new satellite television service for all of Europe because "the people of Europe want television without frontiers."²⁹ Another major private satellite television venture was the Astra project developed by the Société Européenne des Satellites (SES) from Luxembourg. The important role this organization played in Europe was symbolized when it hired of former EC Vice-Commissioner Etienne Davignon. According to Karl Johannesson, president of one of SES' investors, the Luxembourg government and its partners were committed to create a major pan-European satellite delivery system. It planned to force distribution of its service. Because Luxembourg was a member in the EC, no other EC nation legally could block reception of Astra programs. SES planned delivery of private and public television services, including programs from entrepreneurs like Murdoch and Berlusconi, that would bring Europe a new level of programming choices.³⁰

²⁹Lisa Bannon and Peggy Ziegler, "Maxwell Unveils Plans for Pan-European Network," Multichannel News, April 13, 1987, p. 1.

³⁰Interview with Karl Johannesson, Virginia Beach, Virginia, November 21, 1986.

Major private corporations and entrepreneurs were not the only ones hoping for new initiatives in private television in Europe. Europe's film and television production industries embraced the new medium of satellite television and encouraged its development to stimulate production, create new jobs, and make their industry more competitive.³¹ In 1985 companies from six countries agreed to form a European production group, uniting the skills and resources of organizations from France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, the U.K., and Germany. Their goal was to preserve the European content of their programs and promote Europe's "artistic and production infrastructure."³² Co-ventures like this were formed to meet the projected needs for the European television industry of the future as well as to create a uniquely European product that was marketable in Europe and elsewhere in the world.³³

Summary

The private sector shared many of the same hopes of political leaders for a unified Europe. Monnet, de Vries, Hahn, Lord Cockfield, and others in the political sphere worked for European integration, but they faced resist-

³¹ "Pic Producers See Savior in TV," Variety, May 20, 1987, pp. 1, 62.

³² Jack Monnet, "Euro-British Production Group Formed," Variety, June 29, 1985.

³³ Cox speech.

ance from national governments and other forces. However, while politicians talked about the day when Europe would exist without frontiers, businesses began to conduct their affairs as though the common market existed. The development of satellite television provided a means for men like Murdoch and Berlusconi to televise programs throughout Europe that could be seen daily by people in every country. Through satellite technology, advertising agencies and multinational corporations could distributing single product and lifestyle images throughout the continent. The private sector grasped the significance of the communications revolution and for its purposes made the European market a reality.

CHAPTER VII
THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
IN EUROPEAN TELEVISION

This thesis set out to demonstrate that there was a relationship between television and the integration of Europe. It specifically attempted to prove the hypothesis that the integration process in Europe would continue because of activities in the television industry. Satellite television was to be demonstrated to be a critical factor in this process, and the reaction of national governments in Europe to it was a bellwether of the future of integration. This also attempted to establish that the integration of the television market needed to precede the integration of the entire European market. The work of integration theorists Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, and Amitai Etzioni were cited as the foundation for this study. Etzioni's four stage model of integration was established as the specific framework used to measure Europe's progress toward becoming an integrated organization.

A survey of the television market in Europe in 1987 found the market in a state of tremendous flux. Total control of television was established by national

governments prior to the introduction of satellites, in part because of television's power to create and influence images, opinions, and lifestyles. Television acted to preserve indigenous cultures and provide common "communication habits" that helped form a sense of community within each nation.¹ Even though the exact nature varied, controls were part of the fabric of television in Europe. Yet substantial differences existed in policies. Technical standards and policies on advertising varied. Some nations developed state monopolies while others let private enterprise have a greater influence. Within the EC, the Treaties of Rome and Paris prohibited nations from blocking reception of broadcast signals from other member-nations. While none hindered reception from over-the-air signals, the growth of cable television provided a medium through which censorship was feasible. Some choices had to be made on the number of services a cable system would carry and which services would be carried. The introduction of satellites further complicated this problem since more choices were available for carriage by cable systems. As cable and satellite television grew, past national controls over television remained in effect. Controls in the satellite era became communication barriers as they restricted the free flow of information throughout the Community.² National

¹Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.

²Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.

governments blocked the kind of broad communication interaction across frontiers that lead to the establishment of unifying habits which Deutsch claimed were necessary to achieve integration.³ Rather, nationally controlled television continued to reenforce national loyalties, allegiances, and integration.

However, with satellite television it became as simple to receive a transmission from the U.K. in Spain as in the U.K. itself. All that was needed was the proper technical equipment and reception was possible. Satellite television unleashed new market forces, changed consumer demands, and created the potential for communications systems that were truly European in nature. In fact, satellite television provided the instrument through which integration of the marketplace could move forward and eventually lead to greater unification of Europe. It made it less possible for national governments to control the flow of information and entertainment in their own nations. People throughout Europe would be able to develop shared habits of communication, which was an essential element in Deutsch's definition of integration.⁴ Information through television could then flow to Europeans not only from national centers but also from locations throughout Europe. This kind of movement, in Haas's

³Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.

⁴Ibid., p. 41.

definition of integration, would lead to the shifting of "loyalties, expectations and political activities" away from individual nations to a greater European center.⁵

This investigation revealed how television activities in Europe through 1987 followed Etzioni's four stage model of integration.⁶ Television was a vital environmental factor in the life of European society, with television stations in each country and increasing attention being given to television activities at both the national and European levels. Satellite television was decisive in creating common perspectives on events that would be shared by people throughout Europe.⁷ Leaders within the EC grasped the impact this innovation had for the cause of European integration. They observed that Europe was fragmented into national markets where broadcasting activity was regulated by national governments.⁸ Paralleling Etzioni's model, the second stage focused on elite groups and their impact on this environment. The concentration accorded television by groups throughout Europe in the 1980s proved that television had become a subject of significant concern. Papers and policy proposals were written and developed by

⁵ Haas, Uniting of Europe, p. 16.

⁶ Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 15, 16, 37, 51.

⁷ Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 70-71.

⁸ Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes," p. 16.

the EC and Council of Europe. Over time, many elite groups were formed to administer or coordinate European actions toward various facets of television. These included the EBU, ESA, and EUTELSAT. Cooperation in these areas, coupled with advances in the development of satellite and cable television led to transitional activities typical of Etzioni's third stage of unification. Various unit sectors began exhibiting characteristics of integration. In television these sectors included program production and governmental departments and private companies responsible for technical standards. Significant efforts were made to establish uniform technical standards, and increased cooperative program production projects between nations were begun. Other agreements on television policies were agreed upon through the EC and other IGOs.

The movement toward integration of Europe had advanced in part through the influence of satellite television. Yet total integration had not been achieved. The research that went into this thesis led to agreement with Levitt that the superior technology of satellite television would lead to increased reduction in the barriers that existed throughout Europe.⁹ Satellite television had power of enormous magnitude, and the Europe of 1987 had only begun to experience the force of innovations in communications technology. A persistent

⁹Levitt, Marketing Imagination, pp. 31-32.

drive in the research and development sectors of major electronics industries assured on-going technological advances. The future promised that new, more powerful satellites would be built, and that mechanisms to receive programming services from these satellites would be available for affordable prices. Reception clarity would be enhanced, and viewing options would continue to expand through the introduction of new programming services and increased distribution of existing services. The flow of events pointed inexorably toward the prospect of more opportunities for interrelationships between people and organizations throughout Europe through these communications advances.

However, the force of these technologies did not exist in a free marketplace. European nations historically favored controlled growth and regulation of their economies, particularly following World War II. They had demonstrated an understandable desire for the preservation of their own cultures and ways of life, and resisted efforts to erode national cohesiveness.¹⁰ The willingness of these nations to embrace integration had come with an understanding that national sovereignty and the protection of indigenous cultures would be maintained. Satellite television introduced forces that threatened both the tradition of controls and the nature of society. National

¹⁰Dutch Ministry, Policy Document, p. 10, for example.

governments which had so carefully guarded their own societies against influences they deemed harmful or undesirable were faced with the reality that new satellite programming services of multiple origins could come into their nations. Services were controlled by American multinational corporations like CNN and MTV, as well as by entrepreneurs like Berlusconi and Murdoch. Programs included what some considered American cultural imperialism¹¹ as well as programming content that some people believed was not desirable.¹² They had to find ways to protect their indigenous cultures, satisfy the demands of their citizens, and encourage program production. However, they had to face financial realities as well. Satellite television was more expensive to develop and oversee than broadcast television. High costs were a major reason for the termination of Europa and led to problems for Sky Channel, Europe's most successful satellite television service. Even a nation such as France wondered how it would pay for its own new direct broadcast satellite. Nations had to ask if they could afford to fund the development and oversight of television in the satellite era.

Television also proved a litmus test of integration

¹¹ Di Meana speech.

¹² Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 286-98.

efforts. Nations could not say that they were in favor of integration and continue to resist reception of satellite television services. If nations wanted to increase the interaction with other citizens and nations of Europe to the point that they became integrated, satellite television provided an ideal vehicle. If nations sought to foster the development of a community spirit throughout Europe, what better way than to encourage the exchange of television programs from perspectives of many nations and points of view. If nations wanted to nourish the European culture and heritage, television provided a vehicle for an on-going showcase of European programs and talents. If nations wanted to develop a European market without frontiers in which goods flowed without impediment from nation to nation, television provided a delivery system for information about products and services.

The consensus in Europe was that some regulations over satellite and television use were needed and that a free market in these industries was not advisable. Eutelsat believed that there were limits to the number of satellites that could be supported economically in Europe and that an unregulated satellite development was impractical. The EC, while encouraging pan-European television, also proposed rules to control its development, including programming and advertising standards. The Council of Europe, as well as the EC and individual nations

sought to assure protection of minorities from dominance by the majority. But the question remained how much regulation of television each nation would allow to be made at the European level and how much it would insist on retaining. Each nation also had to determine if its policies and regulations would encourage pan-European television or attempt to squelch it.

It is the conclusion of this thesis that the integration process will continue throughout Europe unless the national governments prevented it. Therefore, the fate of the integration movement rests with these governments. Their decisions will determine the scope, shape, and intensity of the integration process. The first alternative scenario assumed that integration would not proceed if national governments reaffirmed their own controls over television and the rest of national life. Applying Etzioni's model, if these governments preserve their controls over television, they would have reached the third stage of unification and achieved integration in selected unit sectors only. This scenario would mean that all or some nations have determined not to move forward into a more fully integrated Europe. This embrace of nationalism would suggest a rejection of increased integration. This scenario is not likely. The power and influence of satellite television are simply too great. Nations could limit but not eliminate the presence and

impact of satellite communications. The spillover of television programs through broadcast, cable, and satellite distribution systems has already created interlocking habits of communication that are essential to the integration process.¹³ Such new technologies as direct broadcast satellites and home satellite dishes, as well as further advances in cable television and MATV systems will make the blocking of integration of Europe's television market and the rest of Europe almost impossible.

The second scenario suggested that integration would proceed along two or more paths simultaneously with some nations pursuing further integration and others electing not to pursue it. However, the fact that some nations chose to retain stronger national controls would not mean that others were prohibited from pursuing integration. A nation with tight controls and concerns about outside involvement could determine not to pursue pan-Europeanism, while other nations would elect to continue integration efforts. In Etzioni's model, the nations seeking greater integration would proceed through the third stage to the fourth stage, while others would not move to the fourth stage at all. This hypothesis included the assumption that nations would approach integration from unique and individualistic perspectives. Some would pursue integration more aggressively, while others determined to

¹³Deutsch, Political Community, p. 41.

move more slowly, or not at all. This scenario was, in fact, fairly realistic. It would allow for more regionalism in which compatible countries would pursue integration or enhanced cooperation. The nations of Scandinavia pursued this direction with their Tele-X project, while in central Europe France and the Federal Republic of Germany attempted to coordinate their development of satellite television. The EC nations could move forward toward an integrated market without frontiers while other European nations resisted integration. Another possibility would be further integration within the EC itself along regional lines. The southern nations (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) may become more integrated as would the nations in the northern part of the Community. The result of this scenario would be an integration of a part or of parts of Europe.

The third scenario tested was a continuation of the status quo in 1987. In this scenario, television activities would continue to include fairly strong national controls, and nations would work together through various IGOs on cooperative television ventures. There would be a harmonization of technical standards and an attempt to eliminate any harmful or divisive regulations or laws. But the full integration of television policies, as well as the political sovereignty within Europe, would not be either abandoned or embraced completely. Nations would continue

working together whenever it was advisable, agreeable, or convenient; but national controls over television and other aspects of national life would remain firm. Satellites would be used more for national or regional television purposes, with pan-European efforts restricted through government controls. Europe would remain a pluralistic community and continue to be interrelated rather than integrated. It is the conclusion of this thesis that this scenario was not likely. The power and potential of satellite television is too great for the status quo to continue. European nations would have to proceed with integration, individually or as a unit.

Subjects for Further Research

This thesis has approached the impact of television on the integration of Europe from an essentially non-quantitative perspective. It has evaluated the actions of men, nations, and organizations in light of definitions provided by integration theorists and attempted to understand the integration activities without specifically measurable variables. However, this study suggested that such variables exist and merit further analysis. These variable include the following:

1. The number of non-national services available for viewing in each country. If European integration continues, barriers to reception within Europe should disappear and more non-national services become available.

2. The number of television services transmitting on satellite. An increase in satellite television services would indicate an acceptance of cross border programming as well as financial conditions conducive to the kind of monetary commitments necessary to achieve success and expansion in satellite communications. The presence of more private satellite television services would indicate the existence of a large and unified enough European market to warrant the private sector to invest in satellite television. This also would indicate that national barriers to television reception had been relaxed.

3. Television viewing of non-national services. If integration proceeded, more of these services would be available and Europeans would spend more time watching them.

4. The number of households with access to non-broadcast television reception, including cable television, private satellite dishes for direct broadcast satellite viewing, and master antennae systems. Integration would mean a reduction of national barriers to the development of these media.

5. The elimination or loosening of laws prohibiting or restricting reception of non-national satellite services. The presence of such laws would indicate the degree to which integration had fallen short. Their elimination or loosening would indicate movement toward

integration.

6. The number of television programs produced by multinational organizations, or co-ventures between organizations in different countries. Multinational program production would stimulate the integration process by increasing interaction and cooperation among peoples in many nations.

7. Percentage of airtime on all television services devoted to European-produced programs. Increased production would indicate increased opportunities for producers in Europe and the opening of the European television market.

8. The number of people who spoke and/or understood languages other than the traditionally dominant language of their nation. Increased integration of the television market would increase the availability of programs in other languages which in turn would lead to an increase in the understanding of non-national languages.

Each of the above variables is measurable and can be tracked to indicate the degree to which integration has taken place through or because of television activity. But, in addition to these quantifiable variables, others exist which cannot specifically be measured but which can be observed. Increased activity in these areas would provide demonstrable evidence of the influence of television on European integration.

The content of speeches by heads of state and of government regarding the role of television in Europe could be used as indicators. The more these people address the television issue the more important television would seem to be for Europe's future. Lack of attention by these people would indicate the absence of a political mandate or will to address the deeper issues represented by television and its role in society. In addition, articles written in non-television or advertising and marketing industry publications (such as The Economist and The Times of London) concerning television and its role in integrating Europe would indicate its perceived importance to the overall European marketplace.

Action by European IGOs or national governments regarding the television industry or policies could be observed. These would include actions taken by national PTTs or broadcasting organizations to encourage European or multinational approaches to television issues or activities, as well as conferences called by the Council of Europe, the EC, or other IGOs, to study television issues or recommend new policies. Also measurable would be the creation and approval of copyright regulations that eliminate problems in receiving or transmitting satellite or cross-border, over-the-air television services. The copyright issues created many problems in developing satellite television, and a resolution of this issue would

provide considerable stimulation to the development of more pan-European activity in the television industry. Another evidence of integration progress would be the creation of new IGOs for determining aspects of television policy or activity.

The elimination or easing of restrictions on the sale, manufacturing, and installation of home satellite dishes would indicate that European nations were more willing for their citizens to receive programs directly from satellites. Many experts have predicted that Europe will be a major market for such direct broadcast satellites, but this would not be possible unless governments throughout Europe eliminated restrictions to their manufacture and sale.

Trends

A survey of satellite television and the European marketplace of 1987 has resulted in the development of a point-of-view on trends that may take place in Europe in television-related activities in coming years. The following trends may be identified as likely, based on this investigation:

1. Satellite technology will continue to advance, as more powerful, technically sophisticated satellites will be built and launched. This will enable the development of smaller mechanisms capable of receiving signals from satellites, including compact home and portable receive

units. Combined with less expensive production and increased complexity and capacity of micro-technology, direct satellite-to-home television will become a dominant television medium in Europe.

2. The heightened availability of satellite-to-home television will enable people throughout Europe to receive more programs than previously. There will be fewer national distinctions in programming, and a European focus will become dominant as station and production executives target an audience throughout Europe.

3. Technological means, including audio sub-carrier capabilities, will be developed to enable programs to be distributed and received in several languages simultaneously at affordable cost levels.

4. While Europeans will band together to some degree, international programming will become organized more on a global basis, with more co-ventures and joint productions involving organizations throughout the world. Economies of scale, international ownership and financing, and operational efficiencies will lead to cooperation, production, and distribution by multinational corporations. The resulting situation will be a hybrid in which more entertainment programs will be produced internationally but where local and regional focuses will be created and sustained through news, cultural, and public affairs programs.

5. European television standards and policies will be established and clarified allowing national implementation and controls within parameters established through an expanded EC. There will be a harmonization of policies of the EC and the Council of Europe.

6. Europe will become increasingly integrated, but national, local, and regional distinctions will remain and even be intensified in some cases. There will be resistance to homogenization, and local and national factions will urge autonomy and resist Europeanization and globalization of the media. Compromises will be arranged to satisfy national interests, including the encouragement of national broadcast stations that would continue to allow national issues and concerns to be met.

7. Advertising policies will become more flexible, with general acceptance of advertising as a form of program funding. However, advertising will continue to be regulated by national governments within policies established at the European level. There will be resistance to giving advertisers the scope and freedom they are allowed in the United States.

8. A new organization will be created within the EC to oversee television and other mass media. This organization will be patterned after the Federal Communications Commission in the U.S.

9. The late 1980s and early 1990s will be a time

in which many satellite television ventures will fail or be forced to reduce operations due to financial problems. While Europe moves through a transitional phase in the integration of the continent and the development of satellite communication, costs will remain high; and great risks will have to be taken to participate in the satellite television business. Financial troubles will affect both private and public television ventures. Government-sponsored satellite and television projects will have economic difficulties, and some will fail. However, from these troubles and failures will emerge better planned and organized television enterprises that are suited to realistic economic and business-oriented management.

10. The entrepreneurs who invaded the satellite television field in its early years will continue to play an active role in the short-term. However, pressures will be brought by various unions, associations, IGOs, and politicians throughout Europe to limit their influence. Therefore action will be taken to encourage publicly-backed services and ventures and to restrict the influence of entrepreneurs such as Murdoch and Berlusconi.

Conclusion

Regardless of the course the nations of Europe take in the coming years, television has proven to be a major factor in its future. Television will prove to be a barometer of the nature of European integration, and the

people of Europe will see their lives influenced more by
this medium than they have in the past.

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